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Autonomous wide area search, classification and attack using Unmanned Combat
Air Vehicles (UCAVs) is considered. The wide area search and attack scenario is mod-
elled, capturing the important problem parameters of target density in the battle space, the
density of false targets, the seeker and Autonomous Target Recognition (ATR) modules’
performance parameters, as well as munition parameters such as search rate, time, and
warhead lethality. The analysis in this research is an important stepping stone towards es-
tablishing benefits of cooperative search and engagement in a multi-vehicle scenario. This
research uses probabilistic analysis to formulate and analytically solve for the probability
of success in search and engagement as well as probabilities of other events of interest. Two
methods are used to compute these probabilities. The first method utilizes a detailed ex-
amination of the sub-events required for the event of interest to occur. The second method
utilizes a Markov chain approach. In each method, general expressions are first obtained
that are applicable to any assumed a priori distributions of targets and false targets. These
expressions are subsequently applied to a multiple warhead munition/UCAV operating in a
single target/multiple false target scenario and then several multiple target/multiple false
target scenarios. This research shows how the analytically derived results can be applied
to all facets of the balanced system design and operation of Wide Area Search Munitions
(WASM) including the evaluation of cooperation schemes and rules of engagement. This
dissertation also formulates the problem as a control problem and examines the possibil-
ity of utilizing this formulation in the real-time estimation of the target and false target
distribution parameters.
xvii
Decision Factors for Cooperative Multiple Warhead UAV Target Classification and
Attack with Control Applications
I. Introduction and Literature Search
1.1 Overview
Air-to-ground warfare has seen an evolution from unguided gravity bombs to mod-
ern day “smart” bombs guided by lasers and/or Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) aided
by the satellite based Global Positioning System (GPS). Imaging terminal seekers, orig-
inally lock-on before launch, are now capable of autonomous target acquisition and can
now be combined with way-point INS/GPS mid-course guidance to provide autonomous
wide area search air vehicles or munitions. Possible future concepts include cooperative
Wide Area Search Munitions (WASM’s) acting in hunter-killer packs to find dispersed tar-
gets and converge on identified targets to deliver sufficient lethality to accomplish mission
objectives. While the potential utility of these concepts is often acknowledged, there is
insufficient analysis to support an exhaustive evaluation of the effectiveness of these con-
cepts. Specifically, decision factors such as probability of success (kill), expected number
of kills and expected number of false target attacks are needed for evaluation of alternative
concepts and, eventually, operation resource allocation. Much of the work done so far has
concentrated on simulation studies that quantify results for specific scenarios, but often
do not provide the broader underpinning for a thorough understanding of the design and
operational employment aspects of the problem. More analytic work is needed to define
the fundamental nature of the wide area search munition problem, to include identifica-
tion of the critical munition and target environment parameters that must be adequately
modelled for a valid simulation.
Along with the concept of autonomous decision making is the ability to have the
UAVs work together cooperatively. Cooperation among multiple UAVs could result in a
more comprehensive and thorough search, more accurate classification, and more effective
attack of targets. If done in an autonomous fashion (the vehicles conduct those tasks
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without human intervention) we would have, in effect, a fire and forget capacity for a
fleet of UAVs which could search an area and destroy any targets found (or go after a
prioritized list of targets). In fact, “advanced autonomous fault-tolerant guidance and
control algorithms for multiple UAVs in conjunction with effective decentralized multi-
agent coordination strategies are of great interest to DoD [Department of Defense]” [41].
1.2 Previous Work
Much work has been done in the areas of search, classification, and attack of a
target using cooperative control. For our purposes, we will classify the work done to
date according to several categories. The first category which naturally comes to mind is
work done in search theory. In fact, this is the field most closely related to this author’s
work. It is also the field where much analytical work has been done. However, there are
still some holes when we look at the problem from an attack perspective. Specifically,
the works in search theory, including classic works by Koopman [36], Stone [55], and
Washburn [62], do not specifically address scenarios with multiple targets/false targets
and a multi-warhead vehicle. Richardson [48], Stone [54], Benkoski [8], and Stone and
Washburn [58] wrote surveys covering the search literature. Problems discussed included
stationary target problems, moving target problems (to include evading targets as well as
non-evading targets), optimal search density problems, and optimal searcher paths.
Richardson [48] classified the work done in search theory up to that point according
to assumptions made in measures of effectiveness (probability of detection, expected time
to detection, probability of correctly estimating target location), target motion (stationary,
Markovian, diffusion), and characterization of search effort (continuous or discrete). While
this summary concentrated on detection of a target, these classifications work for attack
as well. In addition, when discussing the attack of target(s), we can introduce further
classifications based on assumptions made in the number of searchers (in our case, UCAVs),
whether each UCAV carries a single warhead or multiple warheads, and the number and
distributions of targets and false targets present.
It should be noted that much of the work done to date has concentrated on optimizing
some search criterion. Typically this involves varying the “search effort” (the independent
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variable, typically constrained to be no more than some quantity) to maximize some cri-
terion which usually depends on a detection probability which is a function of the search
effort. A common criterion might be the probability of detection itself. Typically, the
detection probability is such that an object will not be detected with zero search effort
and is certain to be detected with infinite search effort.
1.2.1 Discrete Search, Single Searcher. Typically, a discrete search is such that
the stationary target(s) are each located in one box/cell out of n boxes/cells. Several au-
thors concentrated on searching for a single stationary target. Tognettie [60] concentrated
on knowing the “whereabouts” of his target, but was not concerned with physically locat-
ing the target. That is, the objective is to maximize the probability of correctly stating in
which area the target is located. One can either find the target or, after an unsuccessful
search, correctly guess in which area the target is located. He found that when limited
to n searches, the optimal strategy was to partition the searches such that one area is
missed. His work incorporated multiple “looks” at each area (a look is a single search in
an area with a conditional probability of detection that is constant for that area). Arkin
[3] allowed for simultaneous looks at multiple areas, but the more areas that are searched
simultaneously, the less the probability of detection.
Kadane [30] extended Tognettie’s work by incorporating a cost for search. He ex-
amined searches where, if no target is found during the search, then box (area) i will be
declared to contain the target. He determined that for that type of search, the optimal
search will not include box i. In addition, he developed an algorithm for finding an optimal
whereabouts-search strategy. Trummel and Weisinger [61] incorporated an a priori prob-
ability distribution for the target location. They showed that finding an optimal searcher
path that maximizes probability of detecting the target by the end of a fixed time is NP-
complete, while minimizing the mean time to detection is NP-hard. Hall [21], [22] also
incorporated an a priori target location distribution and introduced the concept of using
a random variable for the probability that a particular search of a particular area will miss
a target that is really there.
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Similar work has been done for multiple targets by Smith and Kimeldorf [52], Kimel-
dorf and Smith [35], Assaf and Zamir [4], and Kelly [34].
1.2.2 Continuous Search, Single Searcher. Most of the more modern work has
concentrated on the continuous search problem. Currently, emphasis is being placed on
continuous search of a moving target.
Most of the work addressing search for stationary targets date back several decades.
Supposedly the stationary target problem has “reached a mature state” [58] with little
expectation of significant extensions. However, we contend that this is not the case once
we incorporate a limited number (greater than 1) of warheads on a UCAV seeking a target
or targets. Most, if not all, of the work done in search theory in effect assumes either
a single warhead (search is complete upon finding the target) or a limitless supply of
warheads (search continues until all targets found and distinguished from any false targets
encountered).
To try and make sense of the literature in this area, and to point out the area of our
contribution, we have delineated this category even more by the number of targets (single
or multiple) and the number of false targets (none or multiple). We can then look at other
categories, such as optimization, cooperation and some control type categories.
1.2.2.1 Single Target, No False Targets. Hoai and Leondes [23] sought
to maximize the detection probability of the target using a single-try (non-redundant)
search which is a function of the search effort and the location of the target. Their search
effort is a function only of the location of the searcher and so uses Dobbie’s [14] extension
of Koopman’s exponential detection law. The main point of their work was to try and
eliminate the need for knowing the target’s a priori probability density function (pdf).
They concluded that the “minimax solution guarantees a positive detection probability at
the expense of degradation in performance”. Performance here is defined as the probability
of detection.
Iida et al. [25] noted that studies on the optimal distribution of search effort had
consistently made an assumption of “local effectiveness of searching effort”. In this as-
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sumption, the searching effort at a point is assumed to only be able to detect an object
at that point and not an object which is in the neighborhood of the point being searched.
Their work eliminates that assumption. They also used an exponential detection function
similar to Koopman’s random search formula and assumed that the search effort was only
dependent on location and not time. In other words, once the searcher looks at an area,
the decision is instantly made on whether an object was detected or not.
Many years earlier, Richardson and Belkin [49] looked at the sensor’s effectiveness
as well, but their work concentrated on the effect of an uncertain, fixed sweep width.
De Guenin [12] provided a method of solving the problem of allocating a given amount of
search-effort to maximize the probability of discovering the object without any assumption
on the form of the detection probability function. This function is the probability of
detecting the target at x given the target is at x using some search effort at x (φ(x)). This
detection probability is then p[φ(x)]. The object’s location is a random variable, X, with
p.d.f. g(x):
g(x)dx = P {x ≤ X ≤ x + dx}





with the total search effort, φ(x) > 0, constrained to some amount
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x) = Φ .
De Guenin’s method for finding φ(x) does not depend on a particular form for p[φ(x)],
uses successive approximations, and gives a unique φ(x). The search is not necessarily
exhaustive, however, but concentrates on most likely locations of the target.
1.2.2.2 Single Target, False Targets. Once we allow for false targets, a
detection function is not enough; we must also be able to classify the object that has
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been detected as either a target or false target. A modelling decision must be made. Do
we assume all objects will be detected (eliminating the detection function - leaving only
the classification function) or do we keep both the detection function and classification
function?
Stone and Stanshine [57], [56] were among the first to look at this issue. They chose
to model the process of finding a target using a detection process (scan the area with the
sole intent of detecting an object with no distinction between the intended target or a
false target) and then a classification process which determined if the contact was a false
target or the intended target. In their model, the classification was certain but only after
a finite, although random, amount of time. In their earlier work, [57], this process could
not be interrupted once begun. Later, [56], they relaxed that requirement. The detection
process, however, was not certain. The probability of detection of an object was, in fact, a
function of the search effort applied (they call it the “broad search density function”) and
is what we are calling in this work the detection probability function (they called it the
“local effectiveness function”). The search effort was a function of time and location of
the target. They then examine the problem of minimizing the mean time to find (contact
and classify) the target. Note that the probability of classifying a false target as a target
is zero. They note the similarities in their concept of broad search detection process to De
Guenin [12] and their concept of their search effort function to Arkin [2].
In their follow-on paper [56], Stone and Stanshine lift the restriction that an inves-
tigation cannot be stopped once initiated. In fact, they allow for a designated maximum
amount of effort applied to the investigation process. Either the object is correctly identi-
fied after that amount of effort or the searcher moves on. Again, no misclassification of a
false target is allowed. They also apply Richardson’s problem of an uncertain sweep width
to their problem.
Dobie [15] noted that Stone and Stanshire’s work assumed that their search plan
did not depend on the number of false targets found. His work looked at allowing search
plans which do depend on the number of false targets found. However, he limits his study
to problems where the number of false targets are bounded and was able to obtain the
solution only for a particular case. In their search plan, the same spot can be searched
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more than once (duplicative search). The Stone papers could also be interpreted this way;
however, using the interpretation that it is a duplicative search, they do not make use of
the number of false targets found in their search plan. They merely mark the FT so it
will not be investigated again. Dobbie’s plan also marks the FT to ensure no duplicative
investigation, but he also utilizes any information concerning the number of false targets
found to that point. “The optimal plan in our class of search plans depends on the number
of found false targets” (Dobbie, pg 913). In fact, each time they detect a false target they
create a new search density (the search effort applied to each spatial increment in the entire
area). Again, as with Stone, they assume that given an infinite amount of search effort,
they will find the target.
Klabaugh [31] looks at scenarios similar to Stone and Dobbie, but models the clas-
sification as an instantaneous process which is reliable only with a given probability. His
search plan could not be modified when false targets are located and correctly classified.
Iida [24] looks at a two-stage search (broad and investigating). His false contacts are
only caused by system noise - meaning the investigating search gives no further information.
This means the investigating search must be abandoned at some point. He then tries to
find the optimum time for the investigating search of the contact. He assumes the signal is
such that it can be determined if it is from a true contact or noise, but only with a given
probability. He also restricts his total search time to some number.
1.2.2.3 Multiple Targets, No False Targets. Cozzolino [11] looked at con-
tinuous search with multiple targets of differing sizes and no false targets. He also looked
at the problem from a probability of detection and classification (with regards to size) as
a function of search effort. He in effect assumes a limitless supply of warheads since he
assumes a Poisson distribution of targets and he has the capacity to find any number of
them. His results include the probability distribution of the number and sizes of discov-
ered objects, and the prior and posterior distributions of the number of objects remaining
undiscovered. The states of his system are the number of objects in an area and their sizes.
It could be noted here that although he gives equations for the probability of contacting
a target by a given time, that this cannot be directly related to probability of attacking
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a target by a given time. Since they are only examining the search for targets, they have
no limitations on the number of false targets misclassified. It simply gets marked as a
target (incorrectly) and they continue on. However, the probability of attacking a target
is dependent on the number of misclassifications of false targets (all the warheads could
be used before getting to the real target).
1.2.2.4 Multiple Targets, False Targets. Jacques and Pachter [26], [29], [27]
have derived an analytic solution for search and attack probabilities when multiple targets
and false targets (all stationary) are present. Their work concentrated on a single munition
searching a region As of area As. In their work [29], analytic solutions for six scenarios of
interest were derived. The scenarios are described as follows (in all scenarios the targets
and false targets are stationary):
Scenario 1: A single target uniformly distributed throughout As and a Poisson field
of false targets.
Scenario 2: Poisson field of targets and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 3: N targets uniformly distributed, and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 4: N uniformly distributed targets, and M uniformly distributed false tar-
gets.
Scenario 5: The battle space consists of a circular disc of radius r centered at the ori-
gin. There are N targets, distributed according to a circular normal distribution centered
at the origin and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 6: Same battle space as Scenario 5, with N targets distributed according
to a circular normal distribution and M false targets distributed according to a circular
normal distribution.
This research extends the work of [29] by incorporating multiple warheads on a single
UCAV searching a field of multiple targets and/or false targets. Using a classification
system similar to Richardson’s [48], this dissertation examines the probability of attack
and probability of kill during a continuous search for stationary targets among multiple
false targets using a single multi-warhead UCAV.
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1.2.3 Cooperation.
1.2.3.1 Cooperative Search. Much work has already been done dealing with
cooperative search. Polycarpou et al. [47:Ch 13] focus on cooperative search in which they
seek to follow a trajectory that would result in maximum gain in information about the
environment (but it could easily be extended to cooperative engagement and classification,
etc). The only cooperation between agents is the sending of the information they have. No
agent tells another what to do nor are there any negotiations between agents. Each seeks
to enhance a global goal (not only its own goal). They call it passive cooperation. It has
the advantage that it is robust to loss of any particular vehicle. Simulation seemed to be
the evaluation tool of choice.
Yang et al. [64], examined cooperative search using an opportunistic cooperative
learning method. This method is used to update a Target Probability Map (TPM) using
sensor readings taken in each cell during the search. A Bayesian update rule was developed
to determine the posteriori probabilities. The TPM is initialized with a priori knowledge
about possible target locations and is updated as the UAVs take their sensor readings. All
UAVs have access to the TPM. The goal of the cooperation is to reduce the uncertainty of
the target locations as rapidly as possible. Their reward scheme has the tradeoff between
trying to explore the environment (in which they try to cover the whole environment as
rapidly as possible) and covering target rich areas they believe have the highest probability
of finding targets. Simulation was used for evaluation.
Flint et al. [18] formulated the problem in terms of multiple UAV’s that must generate
their own paths to maximize the number of targets which are positively identified. They
formulated a discrete time stochastic decision model which they then implemented using
a dynamic programming algorithm.
Bethel and Paras [9] have looked at a “front-end” detector configuration in which
an area is scanned. Targets in that area are said to be in one of M bins which make up
that area. The idea is that of a radar in which bearings to the target(s) are recorded.
The bins are defined by the bearing boundaries. They determine posteriori probabilities
that potential target l (l = 1, 2, . . . , L, the max targets the systems can track) is present
1-9
in the scan (regardless of bin location) and the posteriori probability that that target is
in a certain bin given that the target is present in the scan. They can then multiply
the probabilities and compute the probability that target l is in bin ml. However, these
probabilities cannot be computed directly and must be approximated using a a multi-target
tracking system with individual detector loops and individual tracker loops which uses a
discrete pdf linear Kalman-Bucy filter. Theoretically, the desired probabilities could be
determined from more basic a priori probabilities, but the required computations grow
exponentially with the number of targets they wish to track. For that reason, they chose
the approximation method mentioned previously. They later extend their work to multiple
sensors, but approximation is still required. Our work does not assume a given a priori
distribution of targets or false targets.
Genetic algorithms have been used to develop decision rules for UAVs to “maximize
the information gained by the UAV during its period of operation” [42]. These rules are de-
veloped by running many simulations and modifying the rules based on those simulations;
however, all these searches are based on posteriori probabilities of targets given the obser-
vations they have encountered and depend heavily on simulation to analyze their method.
A proper analytical probabilistic framework could, among other things, help verify these
simulations.
1.2.3.2 Cooperative Classification And Cooperative Attack. Pachter and
Hebert [45] tackled the cooperative classification issue by assuming a rectangular target
with a known and measurable ratio of side lengths. With a given rectangle, their work
shows optimal look angles for classification. In addition, for two UAVs cooperating, it
shows the optimal angular separation for the second look. They then find the minimum
time trajectory to achieve the optimal look angle, given a specific starting point. They do
this for the UAV and for the case where the UAV has a sensor with a circular footprint of
radius r whose center is d units in front of the UAV. In the latter case, the end point is the
target location and the objective is to get the target within r + d units of the UAV with
the UAV looking right at the target. This work would be useful once a UAV has asked
for confirmation from another UAV. The UAVs could collectively determine which one is
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closest and which one is least likely to find another target and do tradeoff calculations to
determine which UAV will conduct the second look (or attack).
Chandler and Pachter [10] looked at cooperative classification and cooperative attack.
Multiple views were combined statistically until sufficient confidence was reached. Nearby
vehicles calculated trajectories and costs to all the objects and were assigned optimally.
When two or more vehicles are utilized to search and attack, a decision must be made
as to whether we continue the search or go attack previously found targets. This leads us
to examine work done in an area called optimal stopping.
1.2.3.3 Cooperative Search, Classification, and Attack. Nygard, et al. [44]
have proposed a method for dealing with a “swarm of air vehicles whose mission is to
search for, classify, attack, and perform battle damage assessment”. In their scenario, each
UAV has a single warhead and can communicate and receive target field information to
and from all the elements of the swarm as it becomes available. The result is an integer
programming problem formulation that results in solutions that are globally optimal and
can be computed locally and independently. To do this, though, one must accurately
specify cost functions.
While some work has been done on aspects of cooperation (particularly in [28]), more
needs to be done. Jacques [28] initially limited his analysis to Scenario 1 (single target
uniformly distributed, Poisson field of false targets) with multiple UAVs. He considered
two different path formulations. One where two UAVs follow the same path, and the
other where two UAVs followed opposing paths. He stated that a general formula for the
probability of mission success (killing the target) for N munitions (i.e. UAVs) has yet to
be defined. In each case, simplifying assumptions were made that the UAVs were identical
and that their behavior when searching over the same path was uncorrelated. Some of
his students then continued his work. In particular, Park [46], Dunkel [16], and Gozaydin
[20] examined Scenario 2. In addition, Jacques [28] made some forays into the cooperative
classification and attack arenas, but again, concentrating on Scenario 1. Pachter [45] also
looked at the classification problem. His work was described in the previous section.
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1.2.4 Optimal Stopping. When dealing with the topic of search, the inevitable
question is when to stop that search. In the literature this has become known as Optimal
Stopping. We will not deal with this topic in this work. Some works related to optimal
stopping are due to Willman [63], Starr [53], Bather [7], and Glazebrook [19]. Keeney [33]
wrote an informative article dealing with the subject of trade-offs in general.
1.2.5 Control Formulation. Finally we will look at areas related to putting this
topic into a control formulation. We have a system in which the states of the system could
be defined as the number of target attacks and the number of false target attacks. The
UCAV’s could be the system’s sensors and actuators. The objective could be to reach a
certain state or maximize the number of target attacks or kills.
1.2.5.1 Markov Model. Work has been done exploiting the Markovian
nature of scenarios similar to the ones we will propose; however, the analysis has tended
to concentrate on duels in which there is either a pursuer/evader relationship or a battle
between Red and Blue forces.
Kress [38] claims to the be the first to have derived state probabilities for the many-
on-one duel. His work treated the time to kill as the random variable. He looked at a
negative exponential distribution on the many side and a gamma-distribution on the one
side. His model had N Red units on a single Blue unit B in which the N Red units fire
continuously and independently of each other.
Feigin, et al. [17] proposed a continuous time homogeneous Markov model (transition
probabilities do not change over time) for analyzing M on N air combat. Their states
consisted of the number of free blue and free red planes and the number of pursuing
blue and pursuing red planes (4 states). They base their Markov model on the following
parameters: detection/advantage acquiring parameter, the average rate at which a pursuer
reaches firing position and fires, the kill probability of a single weapon release, and average
evader’s disengagement rate. They used this model to evaluate acquisition type decisions
and determination of optimal force size for multiple engagements.
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Koopman [37] looked at the problem mainly from a cost (logistical) perspective.
However, he did examine Markovian systems involving duels (opposing forces detecting
and attacking each other). His work provides a good description of how to determine
transition rates.
Barfoot, [6] looked at Markov duels in which the outcomes of shots by each weapon
form a Markov process. Their work concentrates on the outcome of the final end game
(the firing of rounds). They fire volleys in rounds (each fires a volley, then a given time
later they fire again). The interval between firings is constant. Here he extended work
by Ancker and Williams [1] who assumed the outcome of a shot was either ‘killed’ or ‘not
killed’. In Barfoot’s work, the outcome of the round consists of a combination of events,
whether the round hit, whether it killed, and whether the shooter senses the round missed
(and where the missed round went).
Work was done in a non-duel sense by Sung and Sohn [59] who examined a system
of multiple stand-by Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and a single battery against a
single passive enemy target. It was the first to consider such a combined system which
works against a target kill. (The other works prior to this paper looked at direct duels.)
They determined several combat measures of effectiveness to include time-varying mean
and variance of number of RPVs being alive and of surviving enemy target attack, mission
success, mission failure, mean and variance of combat duration time. It used the RPVs
serially. They were in stand-by until the single RPV tracking the target was killed. Then a
single RPV went out of standby to replace the destroyed RPV. The states are denoted by
number of remaining RPVs, target alive or dead, RPV has sent target location to battery
or not.
1.2.5.2 Posteriori Observations. Mahler and Prasanth [41] are proposing
an ambitious research program which will 1) develop a mathematical programming frame-
work for hybrid systems analysis and synthesis, 2) develop a computational hybrid control
paradigm, 3) develop transition-aware anytime algorithms for time-bounded synthesis,
4) develop suitable modelling and cooperative control of UAV swarms for a SEAD-type
mission, 5) develop new theoretical approaches for integrating multiplatform, multisen-
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sor, multitarget sensor management into hybrid systems theory, 6) investigate real-time
nonlinear filtering for detecting and tracking low-observable targets, 7) develop new ap-
proaches to distributed, robust data fusion. They split their work into two categories;
Multi-Agent Collection and Mutli-Agent Coordination. In Coordination, they claim ex-
isting approaches can be divided into three categories: the leader following, behavioral,
and virtual structure approaches. They will look at ways to control a UAV formation
with a novel integration of all three approaches. In Collection, they claim that until
recently there has been no systematic, rigorous, and yet practical engineering statistics
upon which to base multisensor, multi-object tracking. As a result, they believe progress
has been hampered in “multisensor-multitarget data fusion, detection, tracking, and tar-
get identification. This lack has also probably hampered the development of systematic,
control-theoretic approaches to sensor management, distributed sensor management, and
multiplatform coordination” [41]. They propose using Finite-set statistics (FISST) to be
that basis. They expect their research will address many, if not all, of those gaps.
Mahler’s Multi-Agent Sensor Management seems to be the most closely related to the
control formulation aspect of our research. They define sensor management as the process
of “redirecting the right data-collection source at the right place or platform to the right
target at the right time.” They also say sensor management is inherently a stochastic multi-
object problem (groups of targets, groups of sensors, groups of platforms, whose states and
numbers can and do vary randomly in space and time). Their approach is to treat the
Multi-Agent Collection and coordination process as “what it actually is ... a problem in
nonlinear adaptive control theory in which both the data sources being controlled and the
targets being tracked by the control process are, mathematically speaking, multi-object
systems” [41]. FISST is an intriguing concept which could be an alternative to the control
formulation we will propose.
A subset of the FISST concept is the Joint Multitarget Probability (JMP). Kastella
presents “an approach to detection, tracking, classification and sensor management based
on recursive evaluation of a joint multitarget probability” [32]. This probability is the con-
ditional probability that there are exactly n targets of class c, located in cells x, based on
a set of observations Z. His work looks at a one dimensional field using one sensor which
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can either detect a target or classify a target (but not both at the same time). The sensors
update the a priori distribution (uniform distribution). For his model problem, he had
two target classes with an unknown number of targets. The targets move independently
with Markov transitions to nearest-neighbor cells. The JMP tends to be calculation in-
tensive. Musick presents “a possible approach to the implementation of Joint Multitarget
Probability based on a product approximation for the JMP equations” [43].
1.2.5.3 Parameter Uncertainty. In each of the six scenarios defined in
Section 1.2.2.4, the distributions are characterized by a few parameters. These parameters
are assumed to be known but, in fact, are not. Krokhmal et al. [39] addressed uncertainty
in various parameters by using a Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) methodology. They
looked at a Weapon-Target Assignment (WTA) problem and used CVaR to minimize
a loss function while ensuring a specified minimum probability of kill. Their uncertain
parameters were the probability of kill for given weapons, and the number of targets in
the battle space. Their control was the number of weapons each vehicle used to attack a
target.
1.3 Research Statement
Previous work has concentrated on simulations with some work towards analytic ex-
pressions for some key probabilities. However, these studies have been limited either by
the number of targets, false targets, and/or warheads. This research will focus on develop-
ing the analytic equations for various probabilities and expected values for UCAV’s with
multiple (finite) warheads for six scenarios. We limit our search to a continuous, exhaus-
tive, and non-duplicative search for multiple stationary targets amongst a field of multiple
stationary false targets. Targets and false targets have distinct a priori distributions. In
terms of previous work in the area, we assume constant search effort throughout the area
with the probability of detection of the targets (and false targets) equal to one and a given
probability of correct classification. We assume a single type of target. The probabilities
and expected values for which we will provide analytical expressions follow:
• Probability of an exact number of target attacks and false target attacks
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• Probability of a specified number of target attacks (and false target attacks) and
their expected values
• Probability of certain number of warheads remaining after a region is searched
• Probability of additional target attacks given a certain number of warheads remaining
after a region is searched
• Probability of mission success and expected time of mission success
• Probability of mission failure
• Expected vehicle longevity
We will compute these probabilities for the following scenarios:
• Scenario 1: A single target uniformly distributed throughout As and a Poisson field
of false targets.
• Scenario 2: Poisson field of targets and a Poisson field of false targets.
• Scenario 3: N targets uniformly distributed, and a Poisson field of false targets.
• Scenario 4: N uniformly distributed targets, and M uniformly distributed false tar-
gets.
• Scenario 5: N targets distributed according to a circular normal distribution centered
at the origin amongst a Poisson field of false targets.
• Scenario 6: N targets distributed according to a circular normal distribution amongst
M false targets also distributed according to a circular normal distribution.
With these analytical expressions, we can then show various applications to include
a method to evaluate cooperation schemes and rules of engagement. We also will put
the problem of search, classification and attack of targets which are distributed amongst
multiple false targets into a control formulation. With this formulation we can examine a
possible method to conduct real time estimation of the parameters defining the distribution,
specifically for Scenario 2.
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1.4 Applicability
Results of the type discussed in the previous sections may be used to validate simu-
lation models and to guide the development of tactical algorithms for cooperative search
and engagement. In addition, the analytic framework may be utilized to make acquisition,
design, operational, and tactical decisions. Acquisition decisions may come in the form of
determining cost effectiveness and trade studies such as deciding whether to spend money
improving sensors, warheads, or acquiring more UCAVs. Design decisions include the es-
tablishment of an operating point to balance probability of detection with a desire to keep
false target attacks to an acceptably low level. Operational decisions may include deciding
the number of UCAVs (or the number of warheads on a single UCAV) to send to a battle
space given a probable number and/or location of targets or false targets. Tactical deci-
sions could conceivably take place within the UCAVs themselves. For example, given the
elapsed time of the mission, the UCAV could determine the benefit of continuing the search
(i.e. determining the likelihood of finding another target in the time remaining) versus the
benefit of assisting in classifying and/or attacking a previously discovered target (perhaps
from another UCAV). It would then decide which alternative is more profitable and take
the appropriate action.
1.5 Outline of Document
Chapter II describes the two types of battle spaces that are considered; rectangular
and circular. It then defines the six scenarios considered in the probabilistic analysis.
Chapter III describes, in generic terms, the first of two methods used to develop
the probabilities. This first method finds the probability of the “last attack of interest”
occurring at x. The last attack of interest is the last attack which could define the event in
question. We then integrate that probability over the battle space to find the probability
of that particular event. This method is called the sequential event method. This generic
description of the probabilities apply no matter the distributions assumed for the targets
and false targets. We will find that most of the probabilities in which we are interested
can be easily calculated using the probability of exactly t target attacks and f false target
attacks by x.
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In Chapter IV, we use those generic descriptions of the probabilities and apply them
to the six scenarios. We calculate seven probabilities (or expected values) for Scenarios 1
and 2 and then concentrate on the critical probability, Pt,f (x) for the other scenarios.
Chapter V describes the second method (using Markov chains) to find these same
probabilities and then calculates them.
Once we have the probabilities, we show some examples of applications for them.
Chapter VI looks at the uses for some of the probabilities as they apply to making de-
sign level, operational level and tactical level decisions for a single multi-warhead UCAV.
Chapter VII is an initial examination of putting the problem in a control type formulation
in which we would try to estimate in real time the actual distribution parameters of the
environment we are searching and change a control accordingly. Chapter VIII then ex-
amines some uses of these probabilities as they apply to a couple of cooperation schemes
for search and classification involving two UCAVs. In particular, we evaluate two rules of
engagement for each of the cooperative schemes.




Throughout this research, one of three distributions are assumed for the location of targets
(T’s) and/or false targets (FT’s). The most common distribution for the six scenarios is
the Poisson distribution.
A random variable whose sample space S = {0, 1, 2, ...} has probability mass function




, f = 0, 1, 2, ... (2.1)
is said to obey the Poisson probability law with parameter λ.
The Poisson field of FT’s is characterized by their expected density distribution
α [ 1
km2
] so that when a region of area A is searched, the Poisson probability law parameter
is λ = αA.
Equation (2.1) gives the probability of encountering exactly f FT’s while searching a
Poisson field of FT’s. The parameter λ is the expected number of FT encounters occurring
over a specific area.
The Poisson field of targets is characterized by their expected density distribution
β [ 1
km2
] so that when the region A with area A is searched, the Poisson probability law




, t = 0, 1, 2, ... . (2.2)
If the battle space to be searched is region As with area As and contains N targets,
uniformly distributed, then the probability of a target being in A is




A similar equation is used when dealing with M false targets.
If the location of a target is distributed according to circular normal distribution
centered about the origin with a variance σ2T , then the probability density for a target at
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To find the probability of the target being within a radius r with r2 = x2 + y2, we
convert to polar coordinates and compute as follows:



























The probability of one target out of N targets being in an annulus with inner radius of ρ









To find the probability of the target being within a radius r of the origin, we simply
















From this we can see that the probability of the target being outside a circle of radius r is





Similar equations are developed for M false targets with a variance of σ2FT .
Irrespective of the assumed distributions, each target or false target can be classified
correctly or incorrectly. The confusion matrix specifies the probabilities of both correct
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and incorrect target and false target reports. The basic confusion matrix is shown in Table
2.1, where PTR is the probability of target report and PFTR is the probability of false
target report. Specifically, PTR is the probability that a target is reported as such, given
that a target is indeed encountered, whereas 1 − PTR is the probability that the target is
not recognized as a target. Similarly, PFTR is the probability that a false target is correctly
classified while 1 − PFTR is the probability that the false target is mistaken for a target.














Reported T PTR 1 − PFTR
as FT 1 − PTR PFTR
Obviously, the sum of the entries in each column is 1. Ideally, one would like
PTR = PFTR = 1 ,
i.e., one would like the confusion matrix to be the identity matrix. Unfortunately, Au-
tonomous Target Recognition (ATR) is far from achieving this goal and the parameters
0 < PTR < 1 and 0 < PFTR < 1 of the confusion matrix play a crucial role in determining
the autonomous weapon system’s effectiveness. Further, increasing PTR and increasing
PFTR are competing objectives in the design of an autonomous target recognition sys-
tem. The relationship between PTR and the complement of PFTR is directly analogous to
the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm as depicted in the classical
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve from the radar and communication fields.
Thus, if one manages to make the PTR parameter to increase, PTR → 1, at the same time
the PFTR parameter will decrease resulting in more false positives. This, coupled with a
high density of FT’s, can be catastrophic. If multiple types of targets are involved, the
confusion matrix is of a higher dimension [27]. In this research we confine our attention to
a 2 × 2 confusion matrices, as illustrated in Table 2.1.
For the remainder of this research, we define the following events:
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1. T : The event of a target attack (TA)
2. Tt,(·): The event of t TA’s in the space represented by (·) (usually the normalized
time, x)
3. F : The event of a false target attack (FTA)
4. Ff,(·): The event of f FTA’s in the space represented by (·) (again, usually the
normalized time, x)
A FT may potentially fool the ATR algorithm into believing it is a true target. For a
single-shot (perishable) munition, the probability of engaging the target in the incremental
area ∆A is conditioned on not having engaged a FT prior to arriving at ∆A. Hence, for
the single target scenario, the incremental probability of encountering the target in ∆A is






is the probability that the target is in ∆A and P (F0,A) is the probability of no
false target attacks (FTA) while searching the region A leading up to ∆A. Previous work
[29] has shown that
P (F0,A) = e
(1−PFTR)αA . (2.13)
We confine our development to four scenarios consisting of a rectangular battle space region
As of area As (see Figure 2.1), and two scenarios using a circular battle space region Ar of
area Ar (see Figure 2.2).
We consider the following six scenarios.
• Scenario 1: A single target (T) is uniformly distributed amongst a Poisson field of
false targets (FT).
• Scenario 2: A Poisson field of targets is distributed amongst a Poisson field of false
targets.
• Scenario 3: N targets uniformly distributed, and a Poisson field of false targets.
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Figure 2.1 Rectangular Battle Space Area Definitions
• Scenario 4: N uniformly distributed targets, and M uniformly distributed false tar-
gets.
• Scenario 5: The battle space consists of a circular disc of radius r centered at the
origin. There are N targets, distributed according to a circular normal distribution
centered at the origin and a Poisson field of false targets.
• Scenario 6: Same battle space as Scenario 5, with N targets distributed according to
a circular normal distribution and M false targets distributed according to a circular
normal distribution.
For Scenarios 1 thru 4 we assume one Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV),
equipped with w warheads (w ≥ 1) and flying at a constant speed, V , with a sensor
swath width W . Let Υ be the total (deterministic) time required to search region As, then
As = WV Υ. Let τ be the time in which the UCAV has searched region A. The area
searched, A, is then computed from A = WV τ . Similarly, ∆A = WV ∆τ .
For Scenarios 5 and 6 we assume essentially the same thing. Instead of instantly
covering a rectangular swath ∆A, we assume we can instantly cover a circular annulus
with inner radius ρ and width ∆ρ.






Figure 2.2 Circular Battle Space Area Definitions
and
A = Asx . (2.15)
Obviously, x can also represent a normalized area.
In addition, we define
λFT = αAs . (2.16)
The Poisson parameter for false target encounters is given by
λ = λFT x. (2.17)
Similarly, if β is the expected density of targets then
λT = βAs , (2.18)
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and
λ̃ = λT x (2.19)
is the Poisson parameter for target encounters in the area covered by x.
One objective of this research is to obtain an expression for the probability of oc-
currence of several important events which can all be defined as various combinations of
target attacks (TAs) and/or false target attacks (FTAs). Target attacks have a Poisson
parameter λAT x and false target attacks have Poisson parameter λAFT x.
Define
λAFT ≡ αAAs , (2.20)
where αA = α(1 − PFTR) and represents the density of FTA situations that would occur
in As. In view of (2.15) and (2.20), the expected number of FTA’s in A is
αAA = λAFT x . (2.21)
This is the Poisson parameter for FTA’s. We show in Appendix B, that developing the
equations either way (via FT’s or FTA’s) is equivalent and to transfer from one method to
the other just requires a substitution of variables. That is, we can convert a Poisson field
of FT (or T) to a Poisson field of FTA (or TA) as follows:
λAFT = (1 − PFTR)λFT , (2.22)
λAT = PTRλT . (2.23)
The probabilities of the occurrence of the events of interest can be determined via
several methods. In one method, we compute these probabilities by determining the prob-
ability that the last attack of interest occurs at a certain time, τ , or in light of equation
(2.14), at a certain value of x which represents the percentage of As which has been covered
when the attack occurs (x ∈ [0, 1]). Let p(x)dx be defined as the probability of the last
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attack of interest occurring during the interval [x, x+dx]. Calculating the probability that





The events of interest can be considered as a series of sub-events. These sub-events occur
in As, A, or As− A (or x = 1, x, or 1− x, respectively) . In this method, the probabilities
of these sub-events (the ‘elemental’ probabilities) must be determined to compute the
probability of the event of interest. This sequential events method will be covered in
Chapter III. Then the probabilities will be calculated using a Markov chain approach.
This will be discussed in Chapter V.
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III. Sequential Events Method
We now discuss the definition of events and the sub-events of which they are comprised.
This formulation is general and does not depend on a particular distribution of targets or
false targets. Once the events are defined, we can then compute their probabilities based
on the assumed distributions in each scenario. The probabilities of the occurrence of these
events are determined in subsequent sections.
3.1 Target Attack
If our UCAV has a single warhead, then for the UCAV to attack a target in ∆A, the
UCAV could not have attacked a T or FT in A. The probability of the target attack (TA)
occurring in ∆A (i.e. in [x, x + ∆x]) is then
P {TA in ∆A} = P (T0,A ∩ F0,A ∩ T1,∆A) , (3.1)
where Tt,X is the event ‘t TA’s in X’. Ff,X is defined as ‘f FTA’s in X’.
Recall that the area A and the time x have a one-to-one relationship. The use of A
in (3.1) is for notational purposes. In all of our calculations of probabilities for the various
scenarios, we will develop the equations in terms of the normalized time instead of the
area covered. In addition, we shall see that for each of our scenarios, any probability of
an attack occurring in ∆A will be some term multiplied by ∆x. Therefore, we can express
(3.1) in one of two equivalent ways
p
(1)




1 (x)∆x = P {T0,x ∩ F0,x ∩ T1,∆x} , (3.3)
Regardless of which notation we use, the actual parameter that will be used in the
computations will be x. Note we have also introduced the notation p
(w)
t,f (x) which is the
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probability of exactly t TA’s and f FTA’s in A (i.e. in the interval [0, x]) assuming w
warheads, with t + f ≤ w. This probability with the second index missing (i.e. p
(w)
t (x))
represents the probability of exactly t TA’s in A regardless of the number of FTA’s in A.
The probability of a TA occurring at two different times (x1, x2) is then
P {TA occurs at x1 or x2} = P
{
{T0,x1 ∩ F0,x1 ∩ T1,∆x1} ∪
{T0,x2 ∩ F0,x2 ∩ T1,∆x2}
}
. (3.4)
The unioned events are mutually exclusive, therefore we can sum their probabilities. This
mutual exclusivity holds true for any set of distinct x’s. We can therefore determine the
probability of a TA in any range of x’s. Determining the probability of a TA in As requires
summing (3.2) over all possible A’s in As (or equivalently, all x : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1). To do this, we
will follow the development of the definite integral in Schaum’s outline for calculus [5]. We
divide the interval [0:1] into n subintervals h1, h2, . . . , hn by the insertion of n − 1 points
ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn−1 where 0 < ξ1 < ξ2 < . . . < ξn−1 < 1. We denote the length of subinterval




1 (xi)∆ix = P {T0,xi ∩ F0,xi ∩ T1,∆ix} . (3.5)





































1 (x)dx . (3.9)




1 (x)dx = P {T0,x ∩ F0,x ∩ T1,∆x} , (3.10)
recognizing that several steps are involved as indicated by (3.5) thru (3.8) and that the
equality is really only applicable in terms of integration on the left side and infinite series
on the right as depicted in (3.8).
With a multiple warhead UCAV, we must ensure we have at least one warhead left
after A to attack the T in ∆A, so that
p
(w)
1 (x)dx = P (T0,A ∩ Ff≤w−1,A ∩ T1,∆A) , (3.11)
where Ff≤w−1,A is the event ‘no more than w − 1 FTA’s in A’.
Equation (3.11) is the probability that our last attack of interest (the TA) occurs at
the end of A. Or stated equivalently, it is the probability that the first TA occurs at x.








1 (x)dx . (3.12)
3.2 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks
For reasons which will become evident, we need to determine P
(w)
t,f (As). Of crucial
importance to this discussion is the subtle distinction between encountering a FTA situa-
tion and an actual FTA. The same distinction exists between a TA situation and an actual
3-3
TA. Since both of our scenarios consist of a Poisson distribution of false targets, we will
concentrate on the former.
A FTA situation is one in which a FTA would have occurred if we had a limitless
supply of warheads. A FTA situation becomes a FTA if we have a warhead available when
we come across that FTA situation. For this probability, we will separate events into two
cases. In Case 1, all the warheads are used. In Case 2, not all the warheads are used.
In Case 2, since we have warheads left over, to have exactly f FTA’s means we have
only come across f FTA situations (or else we would have used more warheads). In Case
1, however, all the warheads have been used and we can come across considerably more
FTA situations once we have expended our warheads on the initial f FTA’s and t TA’s,
assuming t + f = w. The practical significance of this distinction is that we will have to
integrate for Case 1, whereas in Case 2 we will not have to integrate but can determine
the probabilities directly for the area in question.
In either case, we must examine two mutually exclusive events. The first event is
that in which a TA is the last attack, the second event is that in which a FTA is the last
attack:
Case 1 (t + f = w): In this case, once the final warhead is released, we do not care




t,f (x)dx = P


{Tt−1,A ∩ Ff,A ∩ T1,∆A}∪
{Tt,A ∩ Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A}

 . (3.13)
Since a TA and a FTA are independent of each other and since the unioned events are
disjoint, we can break down this equation further;
p
(t+f=w)
t,f (x)dx = P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A)P (Ff,A) + P (Tt,A) P (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A) .(3.14)








t,f (x)dx . (3.15)
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Note: If we have a situation where f = 0 or t = 0, we use only the first or last term
(respectively) in (3.14).
Case 2 (t + f < w): In this case, there can be no attacks after ∆A.
p
(t+f<w)
t,f (x)dx = P


{Tt−1,A ∩ Ff,A ∩ T1,∆A ∩ T0,As−A ∩ F0,As−A}∪










t,f (x)dx . (3.17)
We note that in all six scenarios, the event ‘coming across a TA situation’ is independent
of the event ‘coming across a FTA situation’. Also note that the two unioned events in
(3.16) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, we can rewrite (3.16) as
p
(t+f<w)
t,f (x)dx = P {Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A ∩ T0,As−A}P {Ff,A ∩ F0,As−A} +
P {Tt,A ∩ T0,As−A}P {Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A ∩ F0,As−A} . (3.18)
Again, if f = 0 or t = 0, then we only use the first or last term, respectively, in (3.18).
Since there are warheads left after A, then we could not have come across a TA situ-
ation, otherwise we would expend another warhead and have an additional TA. Therefore,
finding the probability of exactly t TA and f FTA in any given area can be answered
directly (without having to integrate). That is, if we can calculate P {Tt,A} directly, then
we can calculate P {Tt,As} directly as well. We can determine the probability of some exact
number of TA’s in As. We see that
P
(w)















t,f (As) + P
(t+f=w)
t,f (As) , (3.20)
where the two terms in (3.20) are defined in (3.17) and (3.15). Also note that in (3.20)
and throughout the rest of the research, we adopt the convention that whenever the upper
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limit on the summation is less than the lower limit, the sum is zero. So then, when t = w
we only calculate the last term in (3.20), that is P
(t+f=w)
w,0 (As).







t (As) . (3.21)
Similarly for FTA’s we have
P
(w)














t,f (As) + P
(t+f=w)
t,f (As) . (3.23)







(·),f (As) . (3.24)
3.3 Probability of a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After the Region A Has
Been Searched
We consider the probability of having wA warheads remaining after sweeping through
a portion of the target area, i.e., we had w − wA warheads spent in A. The probability of
this event is denoted by PwA(x). We need to consider two cases.
Case 1 (wA = 0): This corresponds to the case in which all warheads are spent in
A, i.e., we could have more than w TA and/or FTA situations in A. This is in essence the
same as Case 1 in Section 3.2 (t + f = w). But instead of integrating from x = 0 to x = 1,
we integrate from 0 to x. We will use the notation Az to represent the region which grows
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in size from 0 to A, its area is A.





With these definitions, it is seen that
αAz = αAsz = λFT z (3.27)















































































Case 2 (1 ≤ wA ≤ w): This corresponds to the case in which fewer than w warheads are
used in A (as in Case 2 in Section 3.2 (t+f < w)). Here we also note that to have warheads
left over after A means not all the warheads were used by A Therefore, we must not have
come across any other attack situations (target or false target) in A, so we are then just
looking at the probability of coming across t TA situations and f FTA situations such that
t + f < w.












































3.4 Probability of Additional TA’s Given a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After
the Region A
It is desirable to know the probability of a TA in the rest of the mission given we have
wA warheads remaining. We consider the region Ay whose area is Ay = V Wτy and define
y =
τy
Υ , which goes from 0 to Am = As−A. Table 3.1 summarizes the various parameters.
Table 3.1 Summary of Spaces and Variables of Integration
Space Intermediate Variable of Lower Upper
Space Integration Limit Limit
As A x 0 1
A Az z 0 x
Am = As − A Ay y 0 1 − x
We again examine the probability for two cases. When the number of attacks in
Am are equal to the warheads left (wA), we have a Case 1 situation. When the number
of attacks in Am are less than wA, we have a Case 2 situation. In both cases we are
dealing with a conditional probability and will make use of the fact that for the conditional
probability of ‘A’ given ‘B’, we have
P {A|B} =
P {A ∩ B}
P {B}
.
Case 1 (ty + fy = wA): Define WA to be the event ‘wA warheads left after A’. We
will also define ty and fy to be the number of TA’s and FTA’s, respectively, in Am while t














































Note that in all six of our scenarios, the TA’s and FTA’s are independent of each













FwA−ty ,Ay ∩ Fw−wA−t,A
}
∑w−wA









FwA−ty−1,Ay ∩ F1,∆Ay ∩ Fw−wA−t,A
}
∑w−wA












Case 2 (ty + fy < wA): We can only have ty + fy attack situations in Am , i.e. no TA or


















t=0 {Tt,A ∩ Fw−wA−t,A}
} . (3.37)
Because the TA’s and FTA’s are independent and the events separated by the union












Ffy ,Ay ∩ Fw−wA−t,A
}
∑w−wA


















Ffy ,Ay ∩ Fw−wA−t,A
}
∑w−wA
t=0 P {Tt,A}P {Fw−wA−t,A} .
(3.39)
Then we sum the 2 Cases to calculate the probability of t TA in Am given wA warheads
remain after A.

















Note: whenever we have a negative subscript (such as we would have in Tty−1,Ay when
ty = 0) we ignore that event (or we say the probability of that event is 0).
3.5 Mission Success and Expected Time of Mission Success
When dealing with multiple targets, we can allow the commander to define mission
success by the number of targets he/she wishes to be attacked. We designate this number
as m. We can easily utilize a similar definition of mission success which looks at the number
of targets killed instead of the number of targets attacked by multiplying the probabilities
in this section by the probability of a target kill given a target attack, Pk.






















































We can determine the expected time of mission success (given a mission success). Given
(2.14) we see that calculating the expected time of mission success is equivalent to cal-
culating the expected x of mission success. Let xs denote the normalized time/space of
mission success. Its expected value is E[xs]. To determine this expected value, we normal-
ize the integrand of (3.46) to convert it to a probability density function (pdf), designated
as f
(w)




























We will declare an event ‘Mission Failure’ if one of two sub-events occur. Either:
1. All warheads have been expended before attacking the mth target or;
2. The UCAV has searched battle space As without attacking the mth target with
warheads remaining.
Using our notation
P{mission failure} = P
(w)
t<m(As) , (3.49)































where the last two terms are given in (3.15) and (3.17). In addition to determining the
probability for mission success and failure, we can also examine the expected useful life of
the UCAV.
3.7 Expected Vehicle Longevity
We define vehicle longevity to be the useful life of the UCAV. This usefulness lasts
only as long as there is fuel left in the UCAV (or area to be searched) and warheads left
to attack targets. More formally, we define expected vehicle longevity as follows:
Vehicle Longevity The time at which the last warhead is expended OR the time at
which the UCAV runs out of fuel (or has reached the end of the search area) without
expending the last (wth) warhead.
This definition does not depend on attacking a specific number of targets or false targets.
It merely depends on the total number of attacks.
The probability of all warheads being used is found in (3.29) and the probability
of reaching the end of As without expending the wth warhead is found in (3.31). To
summarize here, we define Wu to be the random variable representing the number of
warheads used. Its realization is wu, and we note
wu = w − wA . (3.53)
The event ‘vehicle longevity’ will be denoted as VL. The probability of this event is








Each of the unioned events are mutually exclusive therefore we sum their probabilities. In
addition, recall the event VL is composed of two parts. Either all the warheads are used
(Wu = w) or not (Wu = wu : wu < w), therefore,









The unioned events in (3.55) are mutually exclusive, and we can obtain the events descrip-
tions from (3.29) and (3.31), so we can write (3.55) (in terms of Az and ∆Az) as



















It is readily seen that all the unioned events in (3.56) are mutually exclusive. In
addition, we recognize that we can evaluate (3.56) for any value of Az (i.e. Azi) and
therefore any value of zi : 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1. Recall that expected vehicle longevity is essentially
composed of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. Either the vehicle has expended
all its warheads or it has run out of fuel (or reached the end of the battle space).
If the UCAV has lost its usefulness because all warheads were expended (the first
term in (3.56)), then the expected vehicle longevity would be the time of the wth attack.
However, if the UCAV lost its usefulness because it ran out of fuel (or ran out of assigned
search space), then we would not declare the end of its usefulness until the end of As (i.e.
when z = 1). Let xvl denote the vehicle longevity (as a normalized time). Its expected











P {Tt,zi ∩ Fw−1−t,zi ∩ T1,∆iz} +










P {Tt,As ∩ Fwu−t,As} . (3.57)
In the next chapter we show how to use these probabilities to compute the various
probabilities for the scenarios. We will do this exhaustively for Scenarios 1 and 2 and then
just concentrate on the very important P
(w)
t,f (x) probability for Scenarios 4 thru 6.
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IV. Calculations Using Events Model
4.1 Scenario 1
The first scenario consists of a single target (T) uniformly distributed amongst a
Poisson field of false targets (FT’s) in a battle space As with area As (see Figure 2.1).
The event ‘FTA’ includes coming across a FT and mistaking it for a T. We simplify our
discussion for now by wrapping those events up in the Poisson FTA parameter λAFT ,
which represents the mean number of FTA situations that would occur in As .
Since we only have one T in Scenario 1, (3.2) can be rewritten as
p
(1)
1 (x)dx = P {(T1,∆A) ∩ (F0,A)} (4.1)
= P {T1,∆A}P {F0,A} (4.2)
since the two events are mutually independent. Examining each probability,
P (T1,∆A) = P {(T1,∆A) ∩ (RT1)} (4.3)
where T1,∆A is the event ‘one T in ∆A’ and ‘RT1’ is the event ‘one target recognized for
what it is’. The event ‘RT1’ is conditioned on there being a T in the area of interest. These
events are also independent, so we can express P (T1,∆A) as the probability of a target in
the area element ∆A viz., WV dt
As
= dx, times the probability PTR of a target report. i.e.
P (T1,∆A) = PTRdx . (4.4)
When the UCAV has w (w ≥ 2) warheads,
p
(w)











The probability of the target being attacked during the UCAV’s battle space sweep is then
P
(w)









e−λAFT xxjdx . (4.7)
Equations (4.8) thru (4.16) are the elemental probabilities for Scenario 1:
P (F1,∆A) = αA∆A = αAV Wdτ = αA
As
Υ
dτ = λAFT dx (4.8)
P {T0,A} = P {T0,A ∪ (T1,A ∩ NRT1)} (4.9)
P{T1,A} = x (4.10)
P {T0,A ∩ T1,∆A ∩ T0,As−A} = PTRdx (4.11)
P {T1,A ∩ T0,As−A} = PTRx (4.12)












P{T0,Az} = 1 − PTRz (4.15)
P{T0,Am} = 1 − (1 − x)PTR (4.16)
where NRT1 represents the event ‘target not recognized for what it is’.
4.1.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. The
probability of P
(w)
t,f (As) is determined from (3.15) and (3.17 and each case has 2 subcases
(t = 0, t = 1).
Case 1: t + f = w
Subcase 1: t = 0 ⇒ f = w. In this case, we only want f − 1 FTA’s and no TA’s



























We note the gamma function itself is
Γ(n + 1) = n! . (4.20)
When we divide γ(α, z) by Γ(α), we have what some have called the regularized incomplete
gamma function.









γ(w + 1, λAFT )
Γ(w + 1)
. (4.21)
We note here that instead of integrating from 0 to 1, we can integrate from 0 to x,









γ(w + 1, λAFT x)
Γ(w + 1)
. (4.22)
At times, this form is more useful. We can easily determine the probability over the whole
battle space, using this form, by setting x = 1.
Subcase 2: t = 1 ⇒ f = w − 1 Now we use both terms of (3.14).
P
(w)






























































which is equivalent to computing P{T1,As∩Ff,As} directly. In other words, when t+f < w,
we are seeking the case of t TA situations and f FTA situations. When t = 0, we have
P
(t+f<w)





















Moreover, we can see this is also the case for a Poisson distribution of TA and Poisson
distribution of FTA, as will be discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1.2 Probability of Specified Number of Target Attacks. It is easy to see that








































Equations (4.32) and (4.33) should sum to unity (the events they represent are exhaustive).
It is easy to show via integration by parts that the sum corresponds to the probability of
at most w FTA’s in As, and this probability is one.
4.1.3 Probability of Specified Number of False Target Attacks. We can also find
the probability of a specified number of false target attacks using (3.23). Since the number
of targets is less than the number of warheads, we must look at several situations to
evaluate (3.23).







0,f (As) + P
(t+f<w)
1,f (As) , (4.34)





















0,w−1 (As) + P
(t+f=w)
1,w−1 (As) , (4.37)
















































































4.1.4 Probability of a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After Region A Has
Been Searched. Since the events in (3.29) are mutually exclusive, their probabilities are




















































γ(w + 1, λAFT x)
Γ(w + 1)
(4.44)
When fewer than w warheads are expended in A, (3.31) becomes










(w − wA − 1)!
(4.45)
where 1
a! ≡ 0 if a < 0.
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4.1.5 Probability of TA Given a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After the





(1 − PTRx)λAFT + PTR (w − wA)










(1 − PTRx)λAFT + PTR (w − wA)
×
(1 − x)e−λAFT (1−x)































PTRλAFT (1 − x)
(1 − PTRx)λAFT + PTR (w − wA)
)
e−λAFT (1−x)






(1 − PTRx) λAFT + PTR (w − wA)
γ(wA + 1, λAFT (1 − x))
Γ(wA + 1)
+
γ(wA, λAFT (1 − x))
Γ(wA)
. (4.49)
Equations (4.48) and (4.49) can be shown numerically to sum to unity as expected.
4-7
4.1.6 P(Mission Success) and Expected Time of Mission Success. For Scenario



































Note that the PTR’s would cancel, leaving no dependence on PTR in E[xs].
4.1.7 P(Mission Failure) and Expected Time of Mission Failure. We have already




0 (As) in (4.32)
)
.
































































































































Scenario 2 consists of a Poisson field of targets and a Poisson field of false targets.
For this new distribution we have the parameters β to represent the density of T’s in the
region As, βA represents the density of TA’s in As. We then define
λT = βAs , (4.56)
⇒ βA = λT x . (4.57)
λAT = βAAs , (4.58)








P{Tt,∆A} = λAT dx , (4.61)
where P{Tt,∆A} is a differential probability. In addition, since Scenario 2 involves a possibly
infinite number of TA situations, the joint probabilities involving TA are independent (as
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the FTA’s were in Scenario 1), i.e.,
P {T0,A ∩ T1,∆A} = e
−λAT xλAT dx . (4.62)
We will continue to formulate the probabilities in terms of a Poisson distribution of TA’s
and FTA’s although (as seen in Scenario 1) we can easily make the following substitutions
to generalize to Poisson distribution of T and FT with the associated confusion matrix.
λAFT = λFT (1 − PFTR) , (4.63)
λAT = λT PTR . (4.64)






e−(λAT +λAFT )xλAT dx . (4.65)
















The FTA elemental probabilities for Scenario 2 were determined in Scenario 1. The prob-
abilities are similar for the TA elemental probabilities.






P (T1,∆A) = λAT dy , (4.68)
P (T0,Am−Ay) = e










4.2.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. Since
we are now dealing with a distribution of TA’s and FTA’s vice a distribution of T’s and
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FT’s, the confusion matrix is absorbed by the attack distribution parameters found in
(4.63) and (4.64). Therefore, in Scenario 2 we do not have subcases as in Scenario 1.
Case 1 [t + f = w (t ≥ 0)]: Equation (3.15) becomes
P
(w=t+f)












After converting to incomplete gamma notation, we obtain
P
(w=t+f)








γ(w, (λAT + λAFT ))
Γ(w)(λAT + λAFT )
w
(4.72)
Case 2 [t + f < w (t ≥ 0)]: After some simplification of (3.17), we see that
P
(w>t+f)
t,f (As) = e


















4.2.2 Probability of Specified Number of Target Attacks and Expected Number.
Substituting (4.71) and (4.73) into (3.20) we calculate the overall probability of t TA’s.
P
(w)

























t (As) = 1 as expected, since having up to w TA’s in
As is exhaustive.







t (As) , (4.76)
(4.77)
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Recall our notation that whenever the upper limit on the summation sign is less than































e−(λAT +λAFT )x . (4.78)
4.2.3 Probability of Specified Number of False Target Attacks and Expected Number.

























































e−(λAT +λAFT )x . (4.80)
4.2.4 Probability of a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After Region A Has
Been Searched. Application of (3.30) and (3.31) to Scenario 2 is straightforward. We
compute















(w − 1 − t)!
) (4.81)
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= (λAT + λAFT )
γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)

















γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w)
(4.83)









(w − wA − t)!
, (4.84)
= e−(λAT +λAFT )x




To illustrate the results of (4.82) and (4.85) we look at a sample case where n = 3, λAT = 3,
and λAFT = 10. We sum the previous probabilities and we see from Figure 4.1 that they
sum to one. We also see in this plot that the probability of having all the warheads
available is one at x = 0 and quickly approaches zero. Since we are expecting an average
of three target attack situations and ten false target attack situations in the battle space
(λAT = 3, λAFT = 10), the probability of having no warheads left becomes a practical
certainty as we approach the end of the battle space. Also note that since we are looking
at the probability of an exact number of warheads (which implies an exact number of
attacks - no more, no less), the probability for an intermediate number of warheads peaks
at some point in the battle space. For example, for wA = 2 (number of attacks = 1), we
initially have a probability of zero at x = 0 but at x ' .07 the probability peaks. This also
coincides with the most likely place where we would have our 2nd attack. After that, it
becomes more likely that another attack will occur (whether a TA or FTA).
A plot of the expected value of wA for the same set of parameters is found in Figure
4.2. Since the probabilities in (4.82) and (4.85) are continuous in x, the expected value is
continuous in x.
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sum of all P(w
A
)s
Figure 4.1 Probability of wA warheads remaining (wA = 0 : 3) at x and their sum:
λAT = 3, λAFT = 10, w = 3





























Figure 4.2 Expected number of warheads remaining at x: λAT = 3, λAFT = 10, w = 3
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4.2.5 Probability of Additional TA’s Given a Certain Number of Warheads Remain-


























γ(wA, (λAT + λAFT ) (1 − x))
Γ(wA)
(4.86)
4.2.6 Probability of Mission Success. For Scenario 2, we will define mission




























(λAT + λAFT )
m+f





























(λAT + λAFT )
m+f+1
γ(m + f + 1, (λAT + λAFT ))
Γ(m + f + 1)
.(4.90)










































γ(w, (λAT + λAFT ))











































































































(λAT + λAFT )


















In this scenario we have N targets uniformly distributed amongst a Poisson field of
false targets. As stated earlier, we will only look at the probability of an exact number of
target attacks and false target attacks.
4.3.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. As in
the other scenarios, we must again split look at this probability for two cases.
Case 1 (t + f = w): Recall that we have to first determine the terms in (3.14). This
equation is repeated here:
p
(t+f=w)
t,f (x)dx = P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A)P (Ff,A) + P (Tt,A) P (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A) .
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Since we have a finite number of targets, the TA events in (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A) are not
independent. We can determine this joint probability using conditional probabilities;
P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A) = P (Tt−1,A|T1,∆A)P (T1,∆A) . (4.96)
To have t− 1 TA in A means we have at least t− 1 T in A. Also, since we have only N T’s
in all of As then to have a TA in ∆A means we can have at most N −1 T in A. In addition,
recall that there can occur at most one event in a uniform distribution (see Appendix C).
Therefore,











P (T1,∆A) = PTRNdx . (4.98)
Therefore,




































Since the FT’s are distributed according to a Poisson distribution, we have





























































































f ! dx ,















































γ(f + N − i, λAFT x)
λf+N−iAFT
(4.105)







































As a reminder, for Scenarios 3 through 6 we are just showing the computation of
Pt,f (x). Once this probability is computed, it is a simple matter of using various combi-
nations of t and f to obtain other probabilities such as Pt(x), P
wA , and probabilities of
mission success and mission failure. However, the probability of additional TA’s given a
certain number of warheads remaining after A cannot be obtained through combinations
of t and f . This is primarily because, for this probability, we must take into account all
the possible states we could be in when we are at the end of A with wA warheads left.
4.4 Scenario 4
In this scenario we have N targets uniformly distributed amongst M false targets,
also uniformly distributed. Again, we exclusively examine the probability of an exact
number of target attacks and false target attacks.
4.4.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. As in
the other scenarios, we must again split look at this probability for two cases.
Case 1 (t + f = w): Recall that we have to first determine the terms in (3.14). This
equation is repeated here:
p
(t+f=w)
t,f (x)dx = P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A)P (Ff,A) + P (Tt,A) P (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A) .
As in Scenario 3, we have a finite number of targets, therefore the TA events in
(Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A) are not independent and evaluate the same as in Scenario 3. In Scenario 4
we do the same types of things for the FTA events in (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A). We can determine
this joint probability using conditional probabilities. Following the same procedure for the





































(1 − PFTR)Mdx . (4.109)


















(AC)c [(AD) + B](N−c) , (4.110)
which then makes






















We then use the binomial conversion to convert the polynomials with x into a series and
integrate to obtain




























N − i + M − j
. (4.112)
Case 2 (t + f < w):
Since we can find the probability of t TA and f FTA directly,
































Once again, we make use of the truncated binomial conversion to obtain














f (1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
M−f . (4.114)
4.5 Scenario 5
In this scenario we have N targets distributed according to a circular normal distri-
bution amongst a Poisson field of false targets.
If the location of an object is distributed according to circular normal distribution
centered about the origin with a variance σ2T , then the probability of the object being at









So to find the probability of the object being within a radius r with r2 = x2 + y2, we
convert to polar coordinates and compute as follows:



























So then, the probability of one object out of N objects being in an annulus with inner










To find the probability of an object being within a radius r of the origin, we simply integrate
















From this we can see that the probability of the object being outside a circle of radius r is





To find the probabilities of objects following a Poisson distribution being in a circular
region of radius ρ and being in an annulus whose inner diameter is ρ with a width of dρ,
we look at the comparable probabilities in a rectangular area.
In the rectangular area, for a Poisson distribution, we had for the area defined by x
P = e−λFT (1−PFTR)x




and for the strip defined by dx
P = λFT (1 − PFTR)dx , (4.124)
where the strip equation is the derivative of the argument in the Poisson distribution.
We see that for the circular area, αcπr









P{Ff,∆A} = 2αcπρ(1 − PFTR) (4.126)
4.5.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. As in
the other scenarios, we must again examine this probability for two cases.
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Case 1 (t + f = w): Recall that we have to first determine the terms in (3.14). This
equation is repeated here:
p
(t+f=w)
t,f (x)dx = P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A)P (Ff,A) + P (Tt,A) P (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A) .
Since we have a finite number of targets, the TA events in (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A) are not
independent. We can determine this joint probability using conditional probabilities as we
did in Scenarios 3 and 4;









































































































































































T PTR , (4.132)
B(ρ) = αcπρ
2(1 − PFTR) , (4.133)
B





































































+ αcπ(1 − PFTR)
)f+1
. (4.136)
Note, we found that when computing the probability, it was faster to use a numerical
integration routine.
Case 2 (t + f < w) :








































In this scenario we have N targets distributed according to a circular normal distri-
bution with variance σ2T amongst a circular normal field of M false targets with variance
σ2FT .









However, now the pdf for a false target is








4.6.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks. As in
the other scenarios, we must again split this probability into two cases.
Case 1 (t + f = w): Recall that we have to first determine the terms in (3.14). This
equation is repeated here:
p
(t+f=w)
t,f (x)dx = P (Tt−1,A ∩ T1,∆A)P (Ff,A) + P (Tt,A) P (Ff−1,A ∩ F1,∆A) .
The A(ρ) and A′(ρ) are the same as for Scenario 5. We calculate the B(ρ) and B′(ρ)
via similarity. That is
TA ∼ FTA (4.141)
σT ∼ σFT (4.142)




























































(B(r))f (1 − B(r))M−f . (4.147)
As in Scenario 5, this could be solved by converting the polynomials to series expressions
using the binomial conversion and then using the incomplete gamma function; however, this
method is computationally slower than using a standard numerical integration package.
Note that, as in Scenarios 3 and 5, Scenarios 4 and 6 are of the same form (in
terms of A(ρ) and B(ρ)). If one could solve (4.146) as written, both scenarios would be
simultaneously solved. Then all that would be required would be to plug in the appropriate
expressions for A(ρ) and B(ρ) for each scenario. However, solution of equation (4.146) is
nontrivial. Instead, it was necessary to make the appropriate substitutions for A(ρ) and
B(ρ) and then solve. However, as in Scenario 5, the calculation of the probability was faster
when using a numerical integration routine than when using the analytical result. In this
case, when using Matlab, the run time for the numerical integration was approximately 0.5
seconds, and the run time for the analytical computation was approximately 37 seconds.
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V. Markov Chain Model
The probabilities of interest can be determined by modelling the system “dynamics” using
Markov techniques in which the state of the system is described by an ordered pair of
states (T ,F) in which T is defined as the number of target attacks, and F is the number of
false target attacks. The state probabilities of this bivariate, continuous-time Markov chain
depend on normalized time (x) into the process. The instantaneous transition probabilities
may depend on the time into the process, the time increment, and the previous state. They
are split into two classes.
1. PTt(x,∆x): Probability of a TA in ∆x given there were exactly t TA’s by x.
2. PFf (x,∆x): Probability of a FTA in ∆x given there were exactly f FTA’s by x.
Two arbitrary points in the Markov chain are diagramed in Figure 5.1. The top portion
of the Figure examines the state (T = t,F = f) where t + f is less than the number of
warheads the UCAV originally carried. The bottom portion of the Figure examines the
state where t + f is equal to the original number of warheads.
For brevity sake, we denote the state (T = t,F = f) at time x as Xt,f,x. The
probability of state Xt,f,x is then P {Xt,f,x}. This is the same probability we represented
as Pt,f (x) in the previous chapters. In this Markov approach, however, it is not only
necessary to keep track of states and previous states; but also to clearly distinguish the
state’s probability from the instantaneous transition probabilities entering and exiting the
Figure 5.1 Partial Transition Rate Diagram for the Markov Chain Model
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states. Note that the probability is equal to zero for any state where any of the subscripts
are less than 0. In addition, when necessary, we distinguish the absorbing states from the
non-absorbing states as follows:
1. (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) is the non-absorbing state in which the total number of attacks
represented by that state are less than the total number of warheads.
2. (Xt,f,x : t + f = w) is the absorbing state in which the total number of attacks
represented by that state are equal to the total number of warheads.
In Scenarios 1 and 2, we are dealing with Poisson and uniform distributions. At
any time instant there can occur, at most, one event. This event can either be a TA or a
FTA. We note that the last row of the Markov chain corresponds to the situation where
t + f = w, therefore these states are absorbing states.
We will be examining the probabilities of various events. Each probability can be
determined from the probability of either one state or some combination of states. If we
look at the Markov chain at a given time (x), we can determine the probability of each
state at that time. We can then determine the probability for each event of interest at
that time.
The most elemental probability is the probability of being in a particular state. For
Markov chains, the probability of being in a particular state at time x can be computed
using the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for the Markov chain.
5.1 Probability of an Exact Number of Target and False Target Attacks
Recall we have defined the state of the system as being the number of target attacks
and the number of false target attacks at time x. We have also seen that we have absorbing
states and non-absorbing states. The derivation of an absorbing state’s probability differs
from the derivation of the probability of a non-absorbing state. When t + f < w (a
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non-absorbing state), the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation is developed as follows
P (Xt,f,x+∆x) = P (Xt−1,f,x)PTt−1(x,∆x) + P (Xt,f−1,x)PFf−1(x,∆x) −
P (Xt,f,x)
(




Ṗ (Xt,f,x) = lim
∆x→0
P (Xt,f,x+∆x) − P (Xt,f,x)
∆x





















For the absorbing states (t + f = w), we obtain















∆x are the instantaneous transition probabilities.
We will now summarize these instantaneous transition probabilities for the various
distributions. The development of these probabilities will be discussed in subsequent sec-
tions.
Recall we are working with a non-dimensional, normalized x. For the Poisson distri-










= λAFT . (5.5)














(M − f)(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
. (5.7)
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FT (1 − PFTR)
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where A(ρ), A′(ρ), B(ρ), and B′(ρ) are defined by (4.131), (4.132), (4.144), and (4.145).





= 2αcπρ(1 − PFTR) . (5.10)
Therefore, for Scenario 1 we have
Ṗ (X1,f,x : t + f < w) =
PTR
1 − PTRx
P (X0,f,x) + λAFT P (X1,f−1,x) −
λAFT P (X1,f,x) , (5.11)






P (X0,f,x) , (5.12)
Ṗ (X1,f,x : t + f = w) =
PTR
1 − PTRx
P (X0,f,x : t + f < w) +
λAFT P (X1,f−1,x : t + f < w) , (5.13)
Ṗ (X0,f,x : t + f = w) = λAFT P (X0,f−1,x : t + f < w) , (5.14)
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the solutions of which are












P (X1,f,x : t + f = w) =
wPTR
λAFT
γ (w, λAFT x)
Γ (w)
, (5.17)
P (X0,f,x : t + f = w) =





γ (w + 1, λAFT x)
Γ (w + 1)
, (5.18)
where γ(α, z) is the incomplete gamma function.
For Scenario 2,
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) = λAT P (Xt−1,f,x) + λAFT P (Xt,f−1,x) −
(λAT + λAFT )P (Xt,f,x) , (5.19)
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f = w) = λAT P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w) +
λAFT P (Xt,f−1,x : t + f < w) . (5.20)
The solution is







e−(λAT +λAFT )x , (5.21)








γ (w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w . (5.22)
Several probabilities can then be derived from P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) and
P (Xt,f,x : t + f = w). The first probability we will derive is the probability of a specific
number of target attacks in normalized time x. This probability (while perhaps important
in its own right) is most useful in the calculation of other probabilities. Specifically, an
operational commander may wish to weigh the cost versus benefit of starting a particular
search and attack operation. To assist the commander in making this decision, several
probabilities could be used as determining factors. In particular, the probability of at least
a specified number of attacks or the expected number of target attacks could be used by
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the commander when determining the value of starting a particular operation. Each of
these first requires the calculation of the probability of a specified number of target attacks.
5.2 Probability of Specified Number of Target Attacks
The probability of a specified number of target attacks is determined by summing
the probabilities of all the states which have that number of attacks. This requires a










P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) + P (Xt,w−t,x : t + f = w) , (5.23)
where we adopt the convention that if the upper limit on the summation is less than the
lower limit, the summation is equal to zero. We also adopt a convention that the notation
f ≥ 0 indicates that we include all allowable f ’s greater than or equal to 0; i.e.
⋃w−t
f=0 f .




































γ (w + 1, λAFT x)
Γ (w + 1)
. (5.25)























(λAT + λAFT )
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tP (Xt,f≥0,x) . (5.27)
Now we can compute the probability of at least a specified number of target attacks.
5.3 Probability of at Least a Specified Number of Target Attacks





P (Xt,f≥0,x) . (5.28)
For Scenario 1, the probability is inconsequential since there is only one target. For Scenario

























γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w , (5.29)
or equivalently
























γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w . (5.30)
In addition, of potential interest to a tactical commander is knowing the expected
number of warheads left after searching a percentage of the battle space. This information
could be useful in planning area coverage using multiple UCAVs.
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5.4 Probability of a Certain Number of Warheads Remaining After Region A Has Been
Searched
We designate WA as the random variable representing the remaining number of
warheads after covering A. A realization of the random variable is wA. The probability of
wA warheads left after A (denoted P
wA) is equivalently stated as the probability of w−wA
attacks (whether TA or FTA) in A:
PwA(x) ≡ P (WA = wA) (5.31)
= P (w − wA attacks after x) . (5.32)





P (Xt,f=w−wA−t,x : t + f < w) ,
= P (X0,f=w−wA,x : t + f < w) + P (X1,f=w−wA−1,x : t + f < w) ,










(w − wA − 1)!
, (5.33)





P (Xt,f=w−t,x : t + f = w) ,


























(w − wA − t)!
e−(λAT +λAFT )x (5.35)
= e−(λAT +λAFT )x
















(λAT + λAFT )
w




γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w)
. (5.38)
Once we have covered region A and realize we have wA warheads left, we can then
look at how many TA’s we can expect in the remaining region. This remaining region we
denote as Am, where Am ≡ As − A. Its area is Am = As − A. As x marked our passage
through As, so y will mark our passage through Am. That is, y is the proportion of Am
we have already covered when looking at the Markov chain. At the end of A, y = 0 and y
increases to y = 1 at the end of As. Also, we will denote the number of TA’s in Am as ty.
5.5 Probability of Additional TA’s Given WA Warheads Remaining After A
At the end of A, any state such that t + f = w−wA leaves us wA warheads. Each of
these states is a new starting point when looking at the possible number of target attacks
in Am. In essence, we have new Markov chains, one Markov chain for each possible state
that gives us wA warheads after A. As with the previous Markov chains, the instantaneous
transition probabilities may depend on the previous state. In addition, the transition rate
may also depend on the state we were in at the end of A, i.e. the probability of a state
in Am will be conditioned on a previous state as well as the state which started the new
Markov chain. To allow for this, we replace our old instantaneous transition probability
of PTt−1(x,∆x) with P
(
T1,∆y|Xty−1,fy ,y ∩ Xt,f,x
)
which is the probability of a TA in ∆y
given ty − 1 TA’s in y and being in state Xt,f at end of A (i.e. Xt,f,x). Similarly, we also
now have P
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Equation (5.39) applies to the situation where ty + fy < wA. To make this equation
applicable to ty + fy = wA, simply add back in the last term (there is no outflow from a
state such that ty + fy = wA).









In evaluating this expression (and a similar expression for FTA), we take advantage
of the fact that the TA’s and FTA’s are independent of each other assuming there are




























































Also recall that t+ f = w−wA. Assuming that with these last two equations we can solve



















However, when all we know is the number of warheads left after A we must include
all the possible states we could have been in after A. To do so, we shall make use of the













P (Xt,w−wA−t,x) . (5.43)
We shall use the notation P
(









is, the probability of ty TA’s assuming wA warheads left after x (or w −wA attacks in x):
P
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5.5.1 Scenario 1. For Scenario 1, to have a TA in Am means we could not have
a TA by x (nor could we have a TA by the end of y). Therefore, t = 0 (and ty = 0) in
5-11
(5.40), and (5.41). For Scenario 1, we also have the following;
P (T1,∆y) = PTR∆y , (5.46)
P (T0,y ∩ T0,x|T1,∆y) = 1 , (5.47)
P (T1,y ∩ T0,x|T1,∆y) = 0 , (5.48)
P (T0,y ∩ T0,x) = 1 − PTRx − PTRy . (5.49)
And since the FTA’s follow a Poisson distribution, the number of FTA’s in any area are





F1,∆y|Xty ,fy ,y ∩ Xt,f,x
)
∆y
= λAFT . (5.50)
In the Markov chain that we are examining in Am, the probability equals zero for
any state which has a subscript that is less than zero. With that in mind, we note that
the Markov chain in Am is composed of two types of states. One where there are no TA’s
in Am, the other where there is one TA in Am.

















1 − PTRx − PTRy
+
λAFT ) , (5.51)
P
(
X0,fy ,y|X0,f,x : ty + fy < wA
)
=







Now when ty = 1 we have the following;
Ṗ
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To solve (5.39) when ty + fy = wA in closed form, we will make use of the incomplete
gamma function. The solutions are then
P
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Equations (5.51) through (5.56) provides the probabilities for the states in the new
Markov chain which start from a T = 0 state. We need to compute the same probabilities
for the Markov chain which starts from a T = 1 state.
Since Scenario 1 has only 1 target, it is easy to see that
P
(
X1,fy ,y|X1,f,x : ty + fy < wA
)
= 0 , (5.57)
P
(
X1,fy ,y|X1,f,x : ty + fy = wA
)
= 0 . (5.58)
When ty = 0 we have the following:
Ṗ
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When ty + fy = wA, we have
P
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(1 − PTRx)λAFT + PTR (w − wA)




























We see that (5.62) and (5.63) is the same as (4.49) and (4.48) when we set y = 1 − x.
5.5.2 Scenario 2. As stated in Scenario 1, when dealing with Poisson distribution
of FTA’s (and now TA’s), the number of attacks in an area are independent of the number
of attacks in any other area. Therefore, (5.39) and its solution become
Ṗ
(















(λAT + λAFT ) , (5.64)
P
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For the ty + fy = wA situation, we again just add back in the last term of (5.64) and solve:
P
(














(λAT + λAFT )
wA




So then we have
P
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γ(wA, (λAT + λAFT ) y)
Γ(wA) (λAT + λAFT )
wA
, (5.67)

































γ(wA, (λAT + λAFT ) y)










Tty |WA = wA
)
. (5.69)
Other probabilities are of importance as well. We’ll now look at the probability of mission
success and mission failure.
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5.6 Probability of Mission Success
Mission success is defined as attacking at least a pre-specified number, m of targets.








































P (Xt,w−t,x : t + f = w) . (5.71)
We have already computed the probability of mission success for Scenario 1 (since there is


























γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w . (5.72)
or equivalently
























γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w , (5.73)
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5.7 Probability of Mission Failure
Mission failure is the complement of mission success;




















P (Xt,w−t,x : t + f = w) . (5.74)
For Scenario 1 we have








































γ(w, (λAT + λAFT ) x)
Γ(w) (λAT + λAFT )
w . (5.76)
Now that we have the probabilities of various combinations of target and false target
attacks, we can look at probabilities which are also important, especially to commanders
in the field. These probabilities involve not just target attacks but target kills.
5.8 Target Kills
Once we have the probability of target attacks, we can then incorporate the proba-
bility of killing a target. Similar to our notation for events involving TA’s, we define the
following events involving target kills (TK).
1. K: Target Kill
2. Ktk,(·) tk TK’s in the space represented by (·) (usually the normalized time, x)
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Define Pk as the probability of a target kill (TK) given a target attack and P (Ktk,x|Tt,x)
as the probability of exactly tk target kills in x given there were exactly t target attacks









However, when Pk = 1;
P (Ktk,x|Tt,x) = 1 : Pk = 1, tk = t , (5.78)
P (Ktk,x|Tt,x) = 0 : Pk = 1, tk 6= t . (5.79)
We assume in this research Pk < 1.
We can write the equation for the probability of exactly tk TK’s:









Recall that P (Tt≥tk,x) involves a summation over t. In equation (5.80) (and any other time
we see such a combination of terms), the terms after the P (Tt≥tk,x) term are included in















When computing these probabilities in Am we have
P
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γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)









Recall our convention that any time the summation superscript is less than the subscript,
the summation is equal to zero.
Equation (5.84) would be used in any situations requiring the expected number of





tkP (Ktk,x) . (5.85)
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γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)



















































γ(w, (λAT + λAFT )x)










Now when looking in Am we have for Scenario 2
P
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γ(wA, (λAT + λAFT ) y)





















































γ(wA, (λAT + λAFT ) y)

























Which we see is the same as Equation (5.85) with some variable replacements. This is
due to the independent and stationary increments associated with the Poisson processes
inherent in Scenario 2.
We have used Scenarios 1 and 2 to show detailed development of the various prob-
abilities using the Markov chain model. To be complete, we will examine the remaining
scenarios; but, as we did for the sequential events method, we will focus on the develop-
ment of the important probability of exactly t TA and f FTA. Once this is done, we will
summarize that probability for each scenario. Then we can conduct a sensitivity anal-
ysis on various parameters. The parameters λT and λFT are determined by the battle
space. These parameters represent the expected density of targets and false targets, re-
spectively. However, the following parameters are determined by equipment investment
and operational considerations; PTR, PFTR, Pk, w.
5.9 Scenario 3: Markov Chain Approach
For Scenario 3 the evaluation of the instantaneous transition probabilities is deter-
mined as follows:





Since there are N targets uniformly distributed, then we have (assuming N∆x  1)














P tTR(1 − PTR)
i−t . (5.94)



































































Recall that PTt(x,∆x) is the probability of a TA occurring after t TA’s have occurred by
x.
Because of the independent and stationary increments of the Poisson process, PFf (x,∆x)
is a constant;














= λAFT . (5.103)
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Making
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w) +






P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) , (5.104)
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f = w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w) +
λAFT P (Xt,f−1,x : t + f < w) . (5.105)
Again, whenever a subscript is less than zero, that probability is zero. We solve these
differential equations recursively. That is, we start with state (i = 0, j = 0) incrementing
the number of FTA’s (j) for the given i till we get to j = f , then increment the i. We
continue this until we get to (i = t, j = f). The author used variation of parameters to
solve the differential equations whenever i + j < w and determined that


























See Appendix E for the derivation of (5.107).
By substituting (5.107) into (5.105) we obtain the derivative for the subsequent
t + f = w probability,



































For notational convenience and to show similarities between scenarios, define
Au = PTRx , (5.110)
A
′
u = PTR , (5.111)
Bp = λAFT x , (5.112)
B
′
p = λAFT . (5.113)
We then have
PTt(x) =
(N − t) A′u
(1 − Au)
, (5.114)












































5.10 Scenario 4: Markov Chain Approach
For Scenario 4 the evaluation of the instantaneous transition probabilities is as fol-
lows:




















Using the similarity between a TA and FTA where
N ∼ M, (5.122)
t ∼ f , (5.123)
PTR ∼ (1 − PFTR) , (5.124)
makes
PFf (x,∆x) =
(M − f)(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
∆x , (5.125)





(M − f)(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
. (5.126)
Making
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w) +
(M − (f − 1))(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)





(M − f)(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
)
P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) , (5.127)
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f = w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w) +
(M − (f − 1))(1 − PFTR)
(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
P (Xt,f−1,x : t + f < w) . (5.128)
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Again, whenever a subscript is less than zero, that probability is zero. We solve these
differential equations recursively. That is, we start with state (i = 0, j = 0) incrementing
the number of FTA’s (j) for the given i until we get to j = f , then increment the i. We
continue this until we get to (i = t, j = f). The author used variation of parameters to
solve the differential equations whenever i + j < w and determined that

















(1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
M−f , (5.129)













f (1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
M−f . (5.130)
So then for t + f = w









(M − j) ((1 − PFTR))































Similar to Scenario 3, we utilize
Au = PTRx , (5.133)
A
′
u = PTR , (5.134)
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and define
Bu = (1 − PFTR)x , (5.135)
B
′
u = (1 − PFTR) . (5.136)





















u (1 − Bu)
M−f , (5.138)





























5.11 Scenario 5: Markov Chain Approach
For Scenario 5 the evaluation of the instantaneous transition probabilities is as fol-
lows:






Since there are N targets with a circular normal distribution we have (assuming
Nρ∆ρ  1)






























































P tTR(1 − PTR)
i−t . (5.144)
















































































and for the Poisson distribution of false targets we have





















T PTR , (5.150)
Bcp = αcπρ
2(1 − PFTR) , (5.151)
B
′
cp = 2αcπρ(1 − PFTR) , (5.152)






PFf (ρ) = B
′
cp . (5.154)
So then the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) −
(
PTt(ρ) + PFf (ρ)
)
P (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) , (5.155)
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f = w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) . (5.156)
Using same method for solving the differential equation as in previous scenarios, we
obtain









































At this point we note the similarity in form between Scenarios 3 and 5. This similarity
can be seen by comparing (5.116) and (5.117) with (5.157) and (5.158). If we could solve
(5.158) in that form, we would solve the Markov formulation for Scenario 3 at the same
time. All that would be required would be to make the appropriate substitutions for A
and B. However, this equation proved intractable in that form.
We have noted in Chapter IV that Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f = w) can be integrated by using
binomial conversions to convert polynomials to series; however, the solution is very compu-
tationally intensive. It is also time intensive to solve (5.155) recursively (such as shown in
Appendix E). Therefore, an attempt was made to solve the Chapman-Kolmogorov equa-
tion without having to use the recursive solution to the differential equations approach.
The unsuccessful attempt to solve it can be found in Appendix F.
5.12 Scenario 6: Markov Chain Approach
For Scenario 6 the evaluation of the instantaneous transition probabilities is as fol-
lows:





We use the same equations for the targets as we did in Scenario 5.
PTt(ρ, ∆ρ) =

















By similarity, we have for the M false targets,
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PFf (ρ, ∆ρ) =






FT (1 − PFTR)∆ρ
[



























T PTR , (5.164)



















FT (1 − PFTR) , (5.166)











So then the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) −
(
PTt(ρ) + PFf (ρ)
)
P (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) , (5.169)
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f = w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) . (5.170)
Using same method for solving the differential equation as in previous scenarios, we
obtain















c (1 − Bc)
M−f , (5.171)































We can see the similarities in form between Scenarios 4 and 6 by comparing (5.138) and
(5.139) with (5.171) and (5.172). As with Scenarios 3 and 5, (5.172) proved intractable in
this form. And solutions derived using the sequential events method were computationally
intensive. It was much faster to solve (5.117), (5.139), (5.158), and (5.172) using numerical
integration techniques. Appendix A summarizes the probability of an exact number of TA
and FTA for each scenario.
5-32
VI. Application of Main Results
We now discuss the application of the probabilities computed in this research. We will
follow a notional UCAV from design to use in the battlefield and examine the use of these
probabilities at several critical stages: weapon system design, operational employment,
and tactical decision making. In this discussion we confine our attention to Scenario 2,
although it is possible to perform a similar analysis for the other scenarios.
6.1 System Design
When designing the system, we must balance the desire to attack real targets with the
desire to minimize false targets (collateral damage). In essence, this is a tradeoff between
the PTR and PFTR parameters in the confusion matrix. Recall that
λAT = PTRλT , (6.1)
λAFT = (1 − PFTR)λFT . (6.2)
In addition to the parameters involving the sensor, PTR and PFTR, we also have the
parameter which defines the effectiveness of the warhead, Pk. Each sensor has its own
possible values of PTR and PFTR and each warhead design has a particular value of Pk.
We must choose appropriate values (the appropriate sensor settings and warhead) for
these parameters. We can use the probabilities developed in this research to make that
determination. First, we must have some understanding of, or make assumptions about, the
range of environments in which this design will be utilized. Based on intelligence or enemy
doctrine, a distribution of targets and false targets is assumed. For purposes of illustration,
we will assume Poisson distributions. For now we will assume λFT = 20, λT = 10, but
the ratio of these parameters will be varied in subsequent sections. To start this analysis,
we calculate the expected number of target kills and assume for the time being that we
have ten warheads, each with Pk = 0.7. We have a choice of two sensors. For each sensor,
we assume that the probability of target attack PTR and probability of false target attack
1 − PFTR are related to a threshold parameter, h. When the target correlation is above
the threshold parameter, the object being examined is declared a target. When it is below
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Figure 6.1 Scenario 2: ROC curves for two possible sensors
the threshold, it is declared a false target. For simplicity sake, we define PTR and PFTR
to be related to h in the following way.
Table 6.1 Sensors
Sensor P (T ) Eqn P (F) Eqn ROC Eqn PFTR(PTR) Eqn
Sensor 1 PTR = 1 − h 1 − PFTR = (1 − h)
10 1 − PFTR = P
10
TR PFTR = 1 − P
10
TR
Sensor 2 PTR = 1 − h 1 − PFTR = (1 − h)
18 1 − PFTR = P
18
TR PFTR = 1 − P
18
TR
So, in general, our sensors are characterized by the governing equation PFTR =
1−P qTR, where q = 10, 18. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve shows the
relation between PTR and 1 − PFTR by plotting one as a function of the other. The ROC
curves for these sensors are found in Figure 6.1. We can examine the various sensors in
terms of the expected number of target kills. This produces the plots in Figure 6.2.
The designer sees from this Figure that for this scenario, and for Pk = 0.7 and
w = 10, the q = 18 sensor does the better job. In addition, we see that at this Pk, there is
no point in raising the threshold so that PTR > 0.84. The reason is found in this sensors’
ROC curve in Figure 6.1, where it can be seen that above PTR = 0.84, the probability of
false target attack increases faster than the probability of target attack. We also see from
6-2















Figure 6.2 Scenario 2: Expected number of TK for two sensors, w = 10, λFT = 20, λT =
10, Pk = 0.7, x = 1
Figure 6.2 that if for some reason we were to limit PTR to less than 0.7, then we might as
well go with the q = 10 sensor - presumably a cheaper sensor.
We now examine the relationship between PTR and Pk for the q = 18 sensor as shown
in Figure 6.3. Figure 6.3 not only indicates that PTR = 0.84 gives the maximum expected
number of target kills, but it also shows that this value is linear (or at least nearly so) with
respect to Pk. This seems to verify an expectation that E[tk] = PkE[t].
Now we analyze the impact of the number of warheads on the expected number of
TK’s. Note that our previous determination of the PTR which gave the maximum E[tk]
was only applicable for w = 10. For example, with everything else the same, the PTR
giving the best E[tk] went up as high as PTR = 0.92 for w = 18. For the rest of the
analysis in this section we will set PTR = 0.9.
The expected number of TK’s for various warhead capacities is found in Figure
6.4. From this Figure we note that with more than fourteen warheads, we start to get
diminishing returns. Obviously, the point at which we get diminishing returns is strongly
related to λT and λFT . As a result of Figure 6.4, we decide to incorporate into our design
a maximum of fourteen warheads.
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Figure 6.3 Scenario 2: Expected number of TK as a function of warhead lethality, w =
10, q = 18, λFT = 20, λT = 10, x = 1























Figure 6.4 Scenario 2: Expected number of Target Kills for various warhead capacities,
λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, PTR = 0.9, q = 18
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Figure 6.5 Scenario 2: Expected number of Target Kills and False Target Attacks for
various warhead capacities, λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.7, q = 18, E[f ] ≤
0.1
The preceding discussion examined the number of expected target kills regardless of
the number of FTA’s. However, FTA’s can be considered to be equivalent to collateral
damage. Therefore, we want to minimize FTA’s or constrain the number of FTA’s to some
number. We will examine the expected number of target kills for various w’s (w = 2 : 20)
and various PTR’s (for a particular λFT and λT ) with a maximum expected number of
FTA’s (E[f ] ≤ 0.1). This is found in Figure 6.5.
The unconstrained maximum E[tk]’s are marked in Figure 6.5 by x’s in the top plot.
Not surprisingly, the maximum increases as w increases. However, there is a plateau for
each curve due to the fact that we have more false targets than targets. As PTR increases,
the correlation threshold decreases meaning we are less discriminating when declaring a
target. Therefore, we will have more FTA’s. At some point, the FTA’s use up too many
warheads reducing the number of possible TA’s.
We see that as we increase w, along with more TK’s, we have more FTA’s. We also
see that we have more FTA’s as we increase PTR. We can therefore limit the number of
FTA’s by setting a minimum threshold level which gives a maximum PTR and therefore a
maximum number of FTA’s for that w. On the upper plot we can then plot the E[tk] for
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that constrained PTR and w. The result is the vertically diagonal line on the upper plot
of Figure 6.5. This line represents the constraint of keeping E[f ] below 0.1. Anywhere to
the left of this line violates the constraint. If we stick to the constraint, we notice that as
we increase w we get to a point of diminishing returns. In this case, it appears there is no
advantage in increasing w above w = 12. Therefore, a designer who is designing for this
situation might decide to design for a maximum of twelve warheads. In addition, we can
examine the variance for target kills.
Figure 6.6 shows the expected number of target kills, its standard deviation of the
mean, and two constraint lines for the same scenario as used in Figure 6.5 except that
Pk is now 0.8. One constraint line is associated with the constraint E[f ] ≤ 0.1. The
other constraint displayed is E[f ] + σ ≤ 0.1. The second constraint will obviously be
more stringent since a greater percentage of the possible number of FTA’s are below the
constraint line. Note that in Figure 6.6 we do not show the E[f ] plots. To meet the more
stringent constraint on FTA’s we must raise the ROC threshold thereby lowering PTR
which of course lowers E[tk]. To take the variance into account, we could then compute
E[tk] − σ for any given PTR and w. This will not necessarily be an integer, but we can
round down to the lower integer and round up to the higher integer to determine upper
and lower approximations to the E[tk]−σ value. We can then determine the probability of
obtaining at least those approximate number of target kills. This was done for the values
along the two constraint lines. The result is found in Figure 6.7. This figure could be used
whenever the values of E[tk] − σ are approximately the same for the two constraints. In
that case, we would use the values from the constraint where the probability is greatest
according to plots such as that found in Figure 6.7.
The design factor of w = 12 is valid for this particular set of λFT and λT . We can do
similar analysis for other λT ’s and λFT ’s and create a plot which, in effect, gives a design
space. To make this plot we must first set a desired increment for E[tk]. The first time
an increase in w produces an increment less than the desired increment will be considered
the point of diminishing returns. That w is then declared to be the maximum constrained
w. In addition, we decided to use a ratio r = λFT /λT which in combination with a λT
6-6































Figure 6.6 Scenario 2: Expected number of Target Kills and Standard Deviation for
various warhead capacities (w = 2 : 20), λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, q =
18, E[f ] ≤ 0.1


































Figure 6.7 Scenario 2: Probability of at least E[tk] − σ for various warhead capacities
(w = 2 : 20) and constraints, λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, q = 18
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Figure 6.8 Scenario 2: Design space for maximum constrained E[tk]: Pk = 0.8, q =
18, E[f ] ≤ 0.1
defines a λFT . The result is found in Figure 6.8. This figure gives the best PTR and w
which maximizes E[tk] while constraining E[f ] ≤ 0.1.
Once a design is chosen, we can then see how robust it is to the possible ranges of
λT ’s and r’s we could expect to come across. Figure 6.9 shows the expected number of
TK’s for various λT ’s and r’s. The x’s correspond to the constraint E[f ] ≤ 0.1. This figure
shows some general rules of thumb a designer should keep in mind. We shall first conduct
our analysis assuming no constraint on FTA, then examine those results when enforcing
a constraint on FTA. To see the first rule of thumb, let us assume that we have correctly
guessed/estimated/determined the ratio but are incorrect about λT . Let us say that we
designed for λT = 5 and r = 10. That being the case, we would have chosen the PTR which
gives us point A1 in the figure. Let us then assume that in reality, unbeknownst to us,
r = 10 but λT is less than 5, say λT = 2. So then, while we are thinking we are operating
at point A1, we are actually operating at point A2. We see that the resulting E[tk] is not
very different from what we would have obtained had we operated at the maximum for
λT = 2, r = 10. Now let us examine the opposite situation, where we underestimate λT
instead of overestimate it. Say that once again we think we are operating at A1 but in
reality λT = 10 which means we are really operating at A3. We see that in this case the
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result is significantly different than if we would have know we were at λT = 10, r = 10 and
had set PTR to be on the curve’s maximum. We can see from the figure, that this is true
in general, it is better to overestimate λT than to underestimate it (given the estimate of
r is correct). That is the first rule of thumb.
The second rule of thumb is determined by assuming we have correctly determined λT
but incorrectly determined r. Using the same type of analysis, let us say that we designed
for λT = 10, r = 2 (point B1) but in reality had either underestimated (in reality r = 10,
point B2) or had overestimated (r really 0.1, point B3). We see that while overestimating
r causes some loss in E[tk] compared to the optimum for that curve, underestimating
creates an even bigger loss. Again, the figure indicates this is true in general. Therefore,
the second rule of thumb is that it is better to overestimate the ratio (given λT is correct).
Therefore, the more robust design would be one that is designed for the maximum λT and
r (when designing for a given range of λT and r).
We now examine the rules of thumb when we include the FTA constraint. Recall the
x’s in Figure 6.9 represent the FTA constraint. For each λT , the x on the furthest right
is for the minimum ratio and the x on the furthest left is for the maximum ratio. We see
that if we underestimate either λT or r we would violate the constraint. Therefore, the
rules of thumb hold for the constrained design as well. It should be pointed out that if the
threshold level of the ATR can be changed in the field, then Figure 6.9 becomes important
at the tactical level as well. Without good estimates of the distribution parameters, the
operator would want to set the ATR ROC threshold to coincide with the high λT and high
r curve (for either the unconstrained or constrained case, as desired).
For the rest of this chapter, we will assume that we are designing for 1 ≤ λT ≤ 10
and 0.1 ≤ r ≤ 2. Therefore, according to the rules of thumb we design for λT = 10 and
r = 2.
Once we have the values we will use for PTR, PFTR, Pk, w, we may then want to
evaluate this design further by doing some simulations. Whenever simulations are being
used, the question usually arises as to the validity of the simulation. A partial validation
can be accomplished using the probabilities described in this research. The designer sets
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Figure 6.9 Scenario 2: Environment Robustness E[tk]: w = 12, Pk = 0.8, q =
18, E[f ] ≤ 0.1
up the simulation to correspond with Scenario 2 and conducts a Monte Carlo experiment.
The probabilities from the Monte Carlo analysis should converge to those calculated using
the equations in this research. Validation work along these lines has been done by Schulz
[51] for the single warhead case.
6.2 Operational Employment
Once the UCAV is fielded, we may want to know the expected number of target kills
as the mission progresses. This information is found in Figure 6.4. We can also use this
figure when preparing to deploy the UCAV. We have to make a tradeoff between range
of the UCAV and number of warheads the UCAV carries (up to a maximum of fourteen
due to weight considerations). We could put the max load of warheads on the UCAV, but
this would reduce the fuel load and therefore the region being searched. What would be
the right combination of fuel and warheads? In this case, let us assume calculations show
that with a full complement of warheads (w = 14), the UCAV can only cover 40% of the
region it could cover if it only carried a payload of two warheads. So we can trade off area
covered for max possible number of targets killed (the number of warheads). Let us also
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Max for given W
Figure 6.10 Scenario 2: Expected Number of Target Kills and Area Covered Tradeoff,
λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, PTR = 0.9, q = 18
assume that calculations show that starting with two warheads, for every two warheads we
add, the UCAV loses 10% of its two warhead range. The decision points are displayed in
Figure 6.10. Based on this Figure, we opt to carry ten warheads to maximize the expected
number of target kills and expect to kill four targets.
Once the decision is made to reduce the max area covered, we need to either rescale
the normalized time (x) or we need to rescale the parameters. We opt to do the latter. To
complete the rescaling, we need the old parameters and the x value which will be the new
maximum x value (denoted xm):
λT = λToldxm = 10(0.6) = 6.0 , (6.3)
λFT = λFToldxm = 20(0.6) = 12 . (6.4)
We then re-normalize the x values so that when we have reached the maximum range with
w = 10 we have x = 1. In addition, we will plot the expected value versus xc = 1−x. The
reason for this will become clearer in the next section.
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Figure 6.11 Scenario 2: Expected Number of Target Kills with Rescaled Area, λFT =
12, λT = 6, Pk = 0.8, PTR = 0.9, q = 18
6.3 Tactical Decision Making
The UCAV originally had ten warheads and, based on Figure 6.11, we expect four
target kills (point A in Figure 6.11). This is based on allowing the UCAV to exhaustively
and non-duplicatively search a region until its fuel is exhausted (represented by the nor-
malized time/normalized area covered x = 1). However, let us assume that partway into
the flight, the UCAV is called out of the battle space to help another UCAV kill some of
its targets. It takes a normalized time of xc = 0.3 from the time it leaves its search, assists
the other UCAV and gets back to the point it left (xc = 0.3 can be thought of as using
30% of its fuel for this deviation from its original mission). In the process of assisting the
other UCAV, this UCAV expended four warheads. Since the amount of fuel available for
the search of the original area and the total number of warheads which can be used in the
original battle space have both decreased, we now have a new (lower) expected value for
the total number of target kills in the original battle space. Figure 6.11 can be used to
determine the new expected value (point B). This figure would also be useful for a UCAV
that does not leave the battle space, but spends time loitering to improve classification of
a target. In this situation, the time spent loitering would be the xc and the number of
warheads would not change from the original.
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Figure 6.12 Scenario 2: Expected number of Target Kills assuming wA warheads remain
after x, λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, PTR = 0.9, q = 18
Finally, let us examine a tactical situation where the UCAV started with ten warheads
and has covered 30% of the battle space and has expended six warheads. We may then
wonder what is the expected number of target kills from this point on. This information
can help us decide if we want the UCAV to continue searching or if we want to forsake this
originally assigned area to send the UCAV to help another UCAV in its search (or attack).
The needed information is found in Figure 6.12, where we see that with four warheads left
and 30% of the originally assigned battle space covered, we can expect two more target
kills (point A). This would be the cost of assisting another UCAV in its search and attack
mission (forsaking the currently assigned area). We note here that Figures 6.11 and 6.12
are equivalent due to the independent and stationary increments inherent in the Poisson
process. These figures would not necessarily be equivalent for other scenarios.
If the UCAV was operating autonomously, the UCAV might have an algorithm that
continuously updates the probability of at least one more target kill, given its current
position. Based on that probability, combined with knowledge of its fuel status, it could
decide whether to continue the search or assist another UCAV which has transmitted a
possible target location. In this case, the UCAV has covered 30% of its region and has
four warheads left. The probability of killing at least one more target is obtained by
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Figure 6.13 Scenario 2: Probability of at least one Target Kill assuming wA warheads
remain after x, λFT = 20, λT = 10, Pk = 0.8, PTR = 0.9, q = 18
P (Ktk≥k,x). We can see in Figure 6.13 that the probability of at least one more target
kill if we continue to search is approximately 97%. Of course, the validity of the results
presented in this section are all subject to the validity of the assumed distributions.
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VII. Control Formulation
In reality, our knowledge of the distribution of targets and false targets is limited. In
addition, when we attack an object, we do not know if we attacked a true target or not.
We just know the ATR declared the object to be a target. However, if we had a Bomb
Damage Assessment (BDA) capability, we could then know (after the fact) that we hit
a target. In fact, we could use this knowledge to assist us in making a better guess at
the distributions of the targets and false targets. With a better guess/estimate of the
distributions, we could improve our chances of attacking targets and avoiding false targets.
Our problem could then be viewed as a control type formulation.
In this formulation, we will again focus on Scenario 2. We assume the BDA capability
is able to detect whether an attacked object was a target or a false target. The states of the
system could be (Tt,x,Ff,x) (or Xt,f,x), λT , and λFT . The actuators would be the UCAV’s,
the sensors would correspond to the mechanism providing the BDA capability as well as
a counter which keeps track of the number of warheads we have used up to this point (or
equivalently, the number of warheads left after the last attack).
The question then arises as to the control command. To answer this question, we
look to the ROC. Recall that we assumed the ATR was such that a correlation factor was
used to decide if the object was a target or a false target. If the correlation was above a
certain threshold, the object was declared to be a target. If below the threshold, it was
declared to be a false target. This threshold is our candidate control. By way of example,
let us assume that we had thought λT = 5, and λFT = 20. As we attack objects and
conduct BDA, we find that λT was higher than expected, say λT = 20. Assuming we can
not change to a different sensor with a different ROC curve (whether in reality or in effect
via cooperative classification with another UCAV), about the only thing left to us is to
change where we are on the ROC curve, via the threshold. In our example, since it looks
like we have more targets than we originally thought, we can be more discriminating and
raise the threshold thereby lowering PTR. For simplicity, we assume that the threshold
parameter, h, and PTR are related as follows;
PTR = 1 − h . (7.1)
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Figure 7.1 Scenario 2: Expected Number of Target Kill as a function of PTR, λT :
λFT = 20, w = 10, Pk = 0.8, q = 18
This erroneously assumes that we can know PTR for certain, when in truth we would most
likely only know its expected value for certain situations. However, in this chapter as well
as Chapter VI, we assume we can know PTR.
By using (7.1) and a ROC curve such as found in Table 6.1 we see that when lowering
the probability of correctly classifying a target given we have come across a target (low-
ering the number of target attacks), we will also lower the number of false target attacks,
leaving more warheads available for attacking targets. This, coupled with the fact that we
now have more targets than originally thought, will serve to increase the total number of
targets attacked. For the rest of this chapter, we seek to maximize the number of target
attacks/kills.
Once we have a good estimate of λT , we can use that knowledge to increase our
expected number of TK’s. Figure 7.1 shows this expected number of TA’s as a function of
PTR and λT ,. The maximum expected number for each λT is marked by a ×. Figure 7.2
shows a plot of the best PTR for a given λT ,(λFT assumed fixed) to maximize our expected
number of target kills. Once we have a good estimate of λT , λFT , we can find the PTR
(the control) to maximize our expected number of target kills.
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Figure 7.2 Scenario 2: Best PTR for maximum Expected Number of Target Kill as a
function of λT : λFT = 20: w = 10, Pk = 0.8, q = 18
For now, we will guess that along with λFT = 20, that λT = 5. We choose the
threshold such that PTR = 0.8 based on Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Recall that for our sensor
model, the ROC curve is defined as
PFTR = 1 − P
q
TR .
If our BDA was 100% accurate, after each measurement (BDA cycle) we would
know the state Xt,f,x exactly, but the values for λT and λFT remain uncertain. We need to
estimate their correct values. We chose to try and estimate these parameters via hypothesis
testing.
A probability which will be very useful in trying to determine the correct values of
λT and λFT is the probability of being in state Xt,f,x given wA warheads left after A,







Now we look at two cases wA 6= 0 and wA = 0. For the former case,
















































































We can see that (7.7) does not depend on the values of λT and λFT , only their ratio.
However, the expected number of TA or FTA is dependent on their values. We also note
that (7.7) does not depend on x. This dependence was cancelled out due to the ratio of
λAT to λAFT . Therefore, any subsequent analysis can be applied to any x. This analysis





For now, let us assume that we have four hypotheses on the value of r (r = 1, 2, 4, 20).
These plots are found in Figure 7.3. Even though the plots in this figure only depend on
the ratio of λFT to λT , we must keep in mind that the actual values of λFT and λT affect
the expected number of target kills and therefore impact the control value we would use.
We see from this figure that if our measurement told us we had six TA’s, then it
would be reasonable to assume (out of these four choices) r = 1, with potential refinement
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Figure 7.3 Scenario 2: Probability of target attack for various ratios of λFT /λT given
four warheads left after A: PTR = 0.9, q = 18, w = 10
later as more warheads are dropped. However, having a good estimate of the ratio r is not
enough to determine a good control value. We also need a good estimate of λT (or λFT ).
Once we have good estimates of r and λT we can determine λFT and use plots similar to
that found in Figure 7.2 to determine the appropriate control.
We can estimate the correct value of λT in a fashion similar to that used in estimating
the ratio. In this case, instead of using the statistic P {Xt,f,x|wA} as we did for the ratio,
we could use the statistic P {WA = wA} as a function of x. Letting r = λFT /λT , (4.85)
becomes
P (wA : 1 ≤ wA ≤ w) = e
−(λAT +λAFT )x








We can then plot this probability as a function of x for various λT ’s as in Figure 7.4. If
we started with ten warheads and had our sixth attack at x = 0.28 and from our previous
analysis we had determined that it was most likely that r = 1, then we would conclude
from Figure 7.4 that of the five choices represented (λT = 20, 10, 5, 2, 1) that λT = 20
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Figure 7.4 Scenario 2: Probability of wA = 4 warheads left after A: r = 1, PTR =
0.9, q = 18, w = 10
seems the best choice. Therefore, if r = 1 and λT = 20, then λFT = 20; and we see from
Figure 7.2 that the new command should be the threshold where PTR = 0.75. Assuming
we have the correct λT and r, this new PTR will maximize our number of target kills.
The previous discussion details the control for the estimated parameter issue. Several
methods for estimating the parameters λT , λFT could be used along with the previous
discussion.
7.1 Hypothesis Testing
Since we do not have just a null and an alternate hypotheses, but instead we have
multiple hypotheses, we will need to use a variation of the traditional hypothesis testing.
One of the potential methods is the Generalized Sequentially Rejective Bonferroni Test
(GSRBT). For an example see [50].
At this point, we note that while Figure 7.2 is to some extent a summary of Figure
7.1, we should not ignore Figure 7.1. We seek the best PTR to maximize the expected
number of target kills. But we can see from Figure 7.1 that as λT increases (decreasing
the ratio r) we get to a point where the maximum number of target kills is unchanging
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even though the best PTR is changing significantly. This can be very useful information.
We can see from Figure 7.1 that we do not have to account for a myriad of hypotheses.
For the situation represented by Figure 7.1 (λFT = 20, w = 10, λT ranging from 1 to 60,
which means r ranges from 20 to 1/3, etc), we can eliminate hypotheses above λT = 30
because the change in expected value is relatively insignificant for a wide range of PTR
values. In fact, we decided that λT = 20 was high enough and were able to limit the
number of possible hypotheses accordingly. We will limit the complexity by choosing four
hypotheses for our analysis of this example. The λT ’s we shall choose are λT = 1, 5, 10, 20
and their corresponding ratios (since λFT = 20) are r = 20, 4, 2, 1.
For a particular value of λT or λFT there will be a particular ratio (designated r
∗)
beyond which no significant increase in E[tk] is observed. In the case represented by Figure
7.1, λFT = 20 has r
∗ = 1 (corresponds to λT = 20 in the figure). This r
∗ value depends
on the value for λFT (or λT ). Recall that our proposed method is to first estimate r then
use that value to estimate λT (or λFT ). Therefore, we should not at this point, limit our
possible ratios for a particular value of λT (or λFT ). Instead we should examine a feasible
range of λT ’s (or λFT ’s) and determine the most extreme r
∗ for that range. This then
would be the appropriate limit for the range of our hypotheses. However, since we are
merely illustrating a potential use of our research, we will continue with a particular value
of λFT .
Table 7.1 Probabilities of #TA Given wA = 4 and Given Several Hypotheses
H20 H4 H2 H1
#TA r = 20 r = 4 r = 2 r = 1
0 0.2074 0.0041 0.0002 0.0000
1 0.3730 0.0369 0.0044 0.0003
2 0.2796 0.1384 0.0330 0.0046
3 0.1118 0.2766 0.1320 0.0368
4 0.0251 0.3110 0.2967 0.1654
5 0.0030 0.1865 0.3558 0.3966
6 0.0002 0.0466 0.1778 0.3964
p value 0.0002 0.0466 0.1778 0.3964
The first step in the GSRBT process is to make an observation and then find the p
values of each hypothesis. Let us assume that BDA tells us that we have hit six actual
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targets. In that case the p values for our hypotheses are found on the bottom row of Table
7.1. Let us also assume that we had decided a priori to set α (the probability of a Type I
error) of α = 0.05 (a typical value).
We can incorporate any a priori information on the hypotheses by using a set of
positive real constants c1, . . . , cP , which have values directly proportional to the importance
of the individual hypotheses. We then define new p values defined as Si = pi/ci. In our
case we will assume we have no a priori information and so will set all the constants equal
to one.
We order the new Si values in ascending order, S(1) ≤ S(2) ≤ · · · ≤ S(P ), letting
c(i) and H(i) be the corresponding constants and hypotheses respectively. In addition, we
define αi = α/
∑P
j=i c(j). Sequential tests can now be conducted as follows: As i goes from
0 to P , if S(i) ≤ αi we reject H(i) and continue on to test the next increment. If S(j) > αj
then we fail to reject H(j) (j = i, . . . , P ).
In our example, with an observation of six TA, we see that the hypotheses are already
in ascending order. That is, H(1) = H20, H(2) = H4, H(3) = H2, H(4) = H1. Our first
test in the sequential testing is for H(1). We see that S(1) = 0.0002 ≤ α1 = 0.05/4, therefore
H(1) is rejected. However, since S(1) = 0.0466 > α2 = 0.05/3 which means we fail to reject
H(i) (i = 2, 3, 4).
The reason for the division of α by the number of tests (and then by decreasing
amounts thereafter) is to correct for a problem that occurs when performing k multiple
independent significance tests each at the α level. The probability of incorrectly rejecting
the null (Type I error) at least once is 1− (1−α)k. For example, with k = 4 and α = 0.05,
there is a 19% chance of at least one of the four tests being declared significant when the
null hypothesis is true. However, it is not certain that the condition of performing four
multiple independent tests is met. If this requirement could be relaxed then we would be
able to reject H(2) as well. In addition, there are other less restrictive modifications to
account for this error.
An alternative approach to this problem is provided by maximum likelihood methods.
In general and simplified terms, these methods would multiply the resulting command from
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each hypothesis by the probability that that hypothesis is true. The resulting command
would be a weighted sum of each hypothesis’ command with the heavier weight placed on
the most probable hypothesis. This might be more fruitful especially when we note that




This chapter examines uses of the probability factors for cooperative behavior. We will ex-
amine some very basic cooperative schemes for two UCAV’s. For mathematical tractability
we will concentrate on Scenario 2. In all schemes we will examine two rules of engagement
(ROE). The schemes, ROE’s, and resulting confusion matrix parameters are similar to
those devised by Jacques [28] and Jacques and Pachter [29]. The first ROE is that both
vehicles must agree that an object is a target before attacking. The second ROE is that
at least one must declare the object a target before attacking. We do not address which
UCAV attacks the target.
8.1 Rules of Engagement
As far as the sensors are concerned, by using these two ROE’s, we have, in effect,
combined both sensors to produce a meta-sensor. This meta-sensor’s properties are de-
termined by the individual UCAV’s sensors and the ROE that governs the classification
process. Let us assume that both UCAV’s have the same type of sensors such that their
sensor parameters are the same. Further, let us assume for the sake of simplicity, that the
declaration of an object as a target by one sensor is independent of the declaration of that
object by the other sensor. If we are working under ROE 1 the meta-sensor’s confusion
matrix is as shown in Table 8.1. We see that the sensor parameters for ROE 1 (both must
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PFTRB = 1 − (1 − PFTR)
2 . (8.2)
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The meta-sensor’s PTR (i.e. PTRB) is lower than the single sensor’s, but the meta-sensor’s
PFTR (i.e. PFTRB) is higher than the single sensor’s. Therefore, we will attack targets less
often, but we will also attack false targets less often. Note this is true even if our PTR and
PFTR could be altered independently (i.e. not related via the ROC).
If working under ROE 2 the confusion matrix is found in Table 8.2. From Table 8.2,














Reported T 1 − (1 − PTR)
2 1 − P 2FTR
as FT (1 − PTR)
2 P 2FTR
we see that the sensor parameters for ROE 2 (either must declare it a target) is





So then, the meta-sensor’s PTR (i.e. PTRE ) is higher than the single sensor’s, but the
meta-sensor’s PFTR (i.e. PFTRE ) is lower than the single sensor’s. We will be more likely
to have target attacks, but also more likely to have false target attacks (given everything
else is the same). Again, this is independent of whether a ROC curve is governing PTR
and PFTR or not. With this information we may consider various cooperative schemes.
8.2 Scheme 1: Travel the Same Path
The first cooperative scheme will be where both UCAV’s travel the same path to-
gether. Figure 8.1 depicts this scheme
In this scheme, each UCAV sees everything the other one sees and both have the same
probability of coming across a T or FT. And since the two UCAV’s are flying together,
either UCAV’s warheads are capable of hitting any target.
Since either UCAV’s warheads can be used and since we are utilizing both UCAV’s
sensors simultaneously on the same field, we in effect have a super-UCAV. One in which
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Figure 8.1 Cooperative Scheme 1
the super-UCAV sensor is defined by the ROE’s described in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 and who
has wB = wucav1 + wucav2 warheads.
For Scenario 2 we will need to define the following variables for the Poisson distribu-
tions.
λATB = PTRBλT , (8.5)
λAFTB = (1 − PFTRB)λFT . (8.6)
This, then, makes the Scenario 2 equations as follows

































































Figure 8.2 Cooperative Scheme 1 Comparison of ROE 1 and 2: wucav1 = 10, λT =
10, λFT = 20, PTR = 0.8, q = 18
Similarly, for ROE 2 we have
λATE = PTREλT , (8.9)
λAFTE = (1 − PFTRE )λFT , (8.10)
and
































Now we can compare the two ROE’s. To do this we will plot the expected number
of target kills vs x (percentage into the battle space) and expected number of false target
attacks vs x. We see this comparison in Figure 8.2. Note what happens when we make
the density of the targets larger than the density of the false targets as seen in Figure 8.3.
In this figure we see a plateau effect, in this case, due to the number of warheads.
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Figure 8.3 Cooperative Scheme 1 Comparison of ROE 1 and 2: wucav1 = 10, λT =
40, λFT = 20, PTR = 0.8, q = 18, Pk = 0.8
We see from these figures that ROE 2 is the best if we are willing to accept the
resulting number of false target attacks. However, if we are not willing to accept the
requisite number of false target attacks, then ROE 1 would be the ROE to choose.
Figure 8.4 shows the same info as a function of PTR. From this figure we can
evaluate the ROE’s for any PTR. In this example, we see from Figure 8.4 that ROE 1 is
more advantageous for both the expected number of target kills as well as the expected
number of FTA’s when PTR > .8. For PTR < .7 ROE 2 is more advantageous for expected
number of target kills with approximately the same expected number of FTA’s. This kind
of information is useful in determining the desired ROE for a given situation.
8.3 Scheme 2: Travel Parallel Paths
For Scheme 2, the two UCAV’s follow parallel paths but with the capability to
instantaneously look at the other path to help in the classification when directed by the
UCAV on that path. The UCAVs can also drop warheads on either path. This either
involves invoking a simplifying assumption of instantaneous transport from one path to
the other, or maybe a bit more realistic, the two UCAV’s flying side by side but using a
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Figure 8.4 Cooperative Scheme 1 Comparison of ROE 1 and 2 and PTR: wucav1 =
10, λT = 40, λFT = 20, q = 18, Pk = 0.8
sensor looking out the side of the UCAV. Each UCAV’s sensor concentrates their search
on their path but can instantly swing the sensors field of view to the other path when
requested by the other UCAV. Figure 8.5 depicts this scheme.
With this scenario, we will assume that when UCAV1 sees an object, it asks UCAV2
to confirm regardless of if UCAV1 classified it as a target or a false target.
The parameters PTRE , PFTRE , PTRB , PFTRB are the same as in the previous scheme,
but the distributions of the targets and false targets are now different. We will designate
the distribution of the targets and false targets on UCAV1’s side as λT1 , λFT1 , respectively.
Similarly, on UCAV2’s side we have λT2 , λAFT2 .
Therefore,
λATE1 = PTREλT1 , (8.13)
λAFTE1 = (1 − PFTRE )λAFT1 , (8.14)
λATB1 = PTRBλT1 , (8.15)
λAFTB1 = (1 − PFTRB )λAFT1 , (8.16)
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Figure 8.5 Cooperative Scheme 2
and similar equations for UCAV2’s territory.
As a side note, if we were to take the same battle space we had in Scheme 1 and use
cooperative Scheme 2 on it, we would have








In addition, we must take into account the various combinations of TA’s and FTA’s
in each of the areas when finding the probability that the system has attacked a certain



























































γ(wB, (λATB1 + λAFTB1 + λATB2 + λAFTB2 )x)




where each subscript of C has a term associated with it and when a subscript is zero, the




















































(f − f1 − 1)!
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(8.22)
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γ(wB, (λATB1 + λAFTB1 + λATB2 + λAFTB2 )x)




We note what happens when the two areas (UCAV1 side and UCAV2 side) have the
same distribution. In fact we will incorporate (8.17) and (8.18). We have































































































Various probabilities of a multi-warhead UCAV searching an area consisting of targets
and false targets were presented. The process was modelled using two methods. In the first
method, an event was described as a series of attacks. The probability of the occurrence
of that event was then obtained by computing the probability that the final attack which
defines that event occurs in [x, x + dx] and integrating that probability as x goes from 0
to 1. This gives the probability of occurrence of the event over the battle space. In the
second method, the process is modelled as a Markov chain and the Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations for the probabilities of the states of the system are developed. These probabilities
are then combined in various ways to compute the probabilities of the event in question.
Using either method, we were able to provide expressions for the probabilities of key
events and expected values, regardless of assumed distributions. We then evaluated several
probabilities and expected values for specific distributions associated with six scenarios.
Scenario 1: A single target uniformly distributed throughout As and a Poisson field
of false targets.
Scenario 2: A Poisson field of targets and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 3: N targets uniformly distributed, and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 4: N uniformly distributed targets, and M uniformly distributed false tar-
gets.
Scenario 5: N targets distributed according to a circular normal distribution centered
at the origin and a Poisson field of false targets.
Scenario 6: N targets distributed according to a circular normal distribution and M
false targets distributed according to a circular normal distribution.
Examples were provided in which the results of this research can be used as decision
factors for either the design and/or operation of a multi-munition UCAV in a search and
attack mode. At a minimal level, probabilities of target attack and mission success can be
analytically determined. In addition, though not included in this research, the expected
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life spans of munition and target can be computed. Furthermore, the examples showed
how these calculated probabilities could be utilized to make acquisition, operational as
well as tactical decisions. Acquisition decisions may come in the form of determining
cost effectiveness and trade-off studies such as deciding whether to spend scarce resources
improving sensors on the UCAVs (i.e. changing the values of PTR and/or PFTR), increasing
warhead effectiveness (i.e. increasing Pk), or buying more UCAVs / increasing each UCAV
warhead capacity (i.e. increasing w). Design considerations could utilize the expected
life spans of munition and target when making any decisions regarding max flight time
of the munition. Operational decisions could be made in terms of deciding the number
of warheads to place on the UCAV when sending it to a battle space given a probable
number and/or layout of targets or false targets. The expected number of target kills
and the expected life spans of munition and target could then be the design factors in
these mission planning / resource allocation decisions. Tactical decisions could take place
within the UCAVs themselves or the operators of the UCAV could make the decisions. For
example, E[Ktky |WA = wA] or P (Ktky≥k,y) can be used as real time decision factors in
online algorithms to determine if the remaining time should be spent searching for another
target or attacking (or re-attacking) a previously designated target. The problem was also
formulated as a control problem. Control inputs were defined for estimated target and
false target distribution parameters. A particular probability was proposed for use in the
estimation process. A cursory investigation was conducted on using that probability and
hypotheses testing as a means to estimate those parameters. Another potential method
which may be more suited to the problem is maximum likelihood estimation using the
proposed probability.
In addition, some rules of engagement for several cooperation schemes were exam-
ined. The long term goal is to develop an analytic tool to reliably assess the benefits of
autonomous vs. cooperative operations. Such a tool should prove to be very useful to
weapon system designers.
9.2 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
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1. The derivation of analytic expressions of relevant probabilities for a multiple
warhead UCAV in Scenarios 1 thru 6 as defined in Chapter II. Besides providing analytic
rigor to the field, this work is filling a void in search theory in the area of continuous search
for stationary targets among multiple false targets using a multi-warhead UCAV.
2. Illustration of possible applications of this research to design of UCAV systems,
as well as their operational and tactical employment.
3. Illustration of a method for evaluation of Rules of Engagement (ROE’s) for coop-
erative schemes for multi-warhead UCAV’s. In this method, the effect of the cooperative
scheme on the distribution parameters was determined. Then the effect of the ROE on
the confusion matrix was computed. Then a parametric analysis can be performed with
which we can compare the effect of the ROE’s and cooperative schemes on performance,
e.g. the expected number of target kills.
4. Introduction of the idea of estimating the distribution parameters and formulating
the problem as a control problem. A particular probability was proposed for use in the
estimation process. This probability should be useful whatever the estimation scheme,
although we performed a cursory look at a particular estimation scheme.
9.3 Recommendations for Further Research
1. Pursue control formulation. Conduct more study on possible estimation methods
to include maximum likelihood methods. Hypotheses testing was only given a cursory
look. This should be examined further as well as maximum likelihood methods and other
estimation methods.
2. Incorporate into the analytics the concept that PTR is a random variable. This
dissertation made the simplifying assumption that PTR was deterministic. This could be
a matter of conditioning the probabilities on another factor; that PTR is a certain value.
We would then multiply the conditional probability by the probability of that PTR value
and integrate over the possible PTR values. This would of course require assuming a
distribution of the PTR value.
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3. Pursue several more cooperative schemes, compare the two ROE’s for those
schemes and compare schemes. First try opposing paths; recognizing that once a UCAV
covers an area, the probability distributions for the targets and false targets have changed
from given a priori distributions to different a posteriori distributions. Also look at a
cooperative scheme where the UCAV’s have orthogonal paths. Then start to look at three
or more UCAV’s cooperating.
4. Incorporate variances into the analysis. We used expected values in our appli-
cations. However, a user does not want to know they have a good system given enough
missions, they want to know their particular mission has a good chance of success.
5. Incorporate multiple types of targets. This then could mean new ROE’s. For
example; attack priority 1 targets immediately (without confirmation), attack priority 2
targets upon confirmation of the classification, attack priority 3 targets only when a UCAV
is unlikely to find a priority 1 or 2 target. This ROE could be compared with standard
ROE’s regardless of the type of target. One could then incorporate ROE’s for cooperative
attack, where the number of warheads dispensed depends on the priority of the target.
6. Incorporate cooperative attack. The cooperation discussed in this dissertation
was mainly for classification and did not investigate the concept of allowing more than one
attack on a target. Further work could be done where a UCAV trades off the chance of
attacking another target in its assigned area versus the chance of killing a target found
(and perhaps attacked) by another UCAV. This would be an extension of work done by
Jacques [28] for the single-warhead case. This development would have some desired level
of probability of kill for which multiple warheads may be required.
7. If multiple types of targets are utilized. Incorporate ROE’s for cooperative attack.
For example: Use two warheads immediately in attacking a priority one target (from the
UCAV that found the target if enough warheads are available). For a priority 2 target, use
only one warhead from the UCAV that found it and one from another UCAV if it is below
a certain probability threshold of finding a priority 1 target. For a priority 3 target, only
use a warhead if below a certain probability threshold of finding a priority 1 or 2 target.
This is just an example. Maybe instead, we would want to use three different required
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probabilities of kill for three types of targets. The possible tie in to the multiple target
classification ROE’s is obvious.
8. Incorporate moving targets into the analytics. Maybe once a target is found it
then has a circular normal distribution for its location. Similarly then, extend the circular
normal distribution work by allowing a center other than the origin.
9. Eliminate the assumption that there are more targets than warheads and more
false targets than warheads. This assumption is inherent in each scenario with a finite
number of targets and/or false targets (with the exception of Scenario 1).
10. Incorporate correlated looks. That is, eliminate the assumption of independence
when looking at the same type of target with the same type of sensor. With this assumption
we were able to say that the probability of declaring three targets given that there are three
targets is (PTR)
3. Without this assumption, the probability of correctly declaring the first
target is PTR but the probability of correctly declaring the second target given we correctly
declared the first target is possibly greater than PTR.
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Appendix A. Probability of an Exact Number of TA and FTA
We have the following equations for the probability of exactly t target attacks (TA) and f
false target attacks (FTA) in normalized time x.
Scenario 1:












P (X1,f,x : t + f = w) =
wPTR
λAFT
γ (w, λAFT x)
Γ (w)
, (A.3)
P (X0,f,x : t + f = w) =





γ (w + 1, λAFT x)
Γ (w + 1)
. (A.4)
Scenario 2:







e−(λAT +λAFT )x , (A.5)
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w . (A.6)
Scenario 3:










































































Au = PTRx , (A.11)
Bp = λAFT x . (A.12)
Scenario 4:














f (1 − (1 − PFTR)x)
M−f ,
(A.13)
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(A.14)




















































Au = PTRx , (A.17)
Bu = (1 − PFTR) x . (A.18)
Scenario 5:


















































2(1 − PFTR) . (A.22)
Scenario 6:















c (1 − Bc)
M−f , (A.23)


















































(1 − PFTR) . (A.26)
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Appendix B. A proof that we can substitute Poisson parameters for T and FT with
Poisson parameters for TA and FTA
In [29] a proof is submitted which shows that we can substitute the parameters (1 −
PFTR)αA for αAA when determining P (F0,A). This relates the Poisson distribution pa-
rameter for FT’s to the Poisson distribution parameter for FTA. In this way, we do not
have to talk in terms of rate of occurrence of attacks (which is composed of many events).
Now we can discuss the rate of occurrence of FT’s we encounter. A proof is submitted here
which shows we can do the same thing when using multiple warheads. We shall concentrate
on FT, but similar things can be done for TA and T.
We have seen previously that for the multiple warhead case, the probability of f
FTA’s in A (assuming not all warheads are used) is






but if we can say (as was done in the single warhead case) that
λAFT = λFT (1 − PFTR) (B.1)
then
P (Ff,A) = e
−λFT (1−PFTR)x




At the same time when we derive P (Ff,A) we find
















where NRf indicates that exactly f of the FT’s are not recognized (seen as T’s). Note that
we have assumed here that the multiple events of (mistaking a FT for T) and (mistaking
a subsequent FT for T) are independent of each other. The binomial coefficient is the
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number of combinations possible when only misdiagnosing f FT’s out of the j FT’s we
have actually come across.
So if (B.2) and (B.4) are equal, we can conclude that we can make the substitution
described in (B.1) when dealing with a not-all-warheads-used situation.
Theorem 1. When computing the probability of a certain number of false target attacks
given that not all the warheads have been used, we can make the substitution
λAFT = λFT (1 − PFTR) .
Proof. We will start with an identity and then show that (B.2) and (B.4) are equal












































































(λFT (1 − PFTR)x)
f
(f)!















(λFT (1 − PFTR)z)
f−1
(f − 1)!
λFT (1 − PFTR)dz . (B.5)















(j−1)−(f−1)λFT (1 − PFTR)dz .(B.6)
If (B.5) and (B.6) are equal, then we can make the substitution (B.1) when dealing with
an all-warheads-used situation.
Theorem 2. When computing the probability of a certain number of false target attacks
given that all the warheads have been used, we can make the substitution
λAFT = λFT (1 − PFTR) .

















































































































































(λFT (1 − PFTR)z)
f−1
(f − 1)!
λFT (1 − PFTR)dz
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Appendix C. Proof of at most one event in infinitesimal area
We wish to determine if the probability of more than one event in ∆x as ∆x → ∞ is
negligible. This is a well known result for a Poisson process. We will see if it is also true
for the uniform and circular normal distribution. To make this determination, we will
follow the same reasoning that Kulkarni [40] uses to show the statement is true for the
Poisson distribution.
In that development, they show that the Poisson process {N(h) : h ≥ 0} has proba-
bility masses for j ≥ 2 events given by
P {N(h) = j} = o(h), j ≥ 2 , (C.1)





= 0 . (C.2)
First we shall examine the Poisson process to demonstrate the methodology. Then we shall
apply it to the uniform and circular normal distributions.
C.1 Poisson distribution
First we will find (verify) the probability of one target in ∆x and find the limit as
∆x → 0. We will let this probability equal f(∆x) + o(∆x),
P{T1,∆x} = f(∆x) + o(∆x) . (C.3)
Then













For this to be true, f(0) = 0 must be true otherwise our limit would be infinity. Therefore,
we must also be able to use L’Hopital’s rule.
0 = lim
∆x→0

















−λT ∆xλT ∆x + e






f ′(∆x) = λT , (C.10)
⇒
f(∆x) = λT ∆x + c . (C.11)
Because of our initial condition f(0) = 0, we see that c = 0 and therefore
P{T1,∆x} = λT ∆x + o(∆x) . (C.12)
Similarly, for P{Tj,∆x}, j ≥ 2, we let
P{Tj,∆x} = f(h) + 0(h) (C.13)
So then















For this to be true, we must use L’Hopitals rule; hence f(0) = 0. Therefore
0 = lim
∆x→0





















−λT ∆x (λT ∆x)
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j! + e









0 + 0 − f ′(0)
1
, (C.20)
f ′(∆x) = 0 , (C.21)
⇒
f(∆x) = c . (C.22)
Because of our initial condition f(0) = 0, we see that c = 0 and therefore
P{Tj,∆x} = o(∆x) , j ≥ 2 . (C.23)
C.2 Uniform distribution
Now we will use the same procedure to examine the uniform scenario. We will limit
our discussion to a uniform distribution of N targets although the same thing can be done
for the uniform distribution of M false targets.
The development for P{T1,∆x} is the same down to equation (C.5). And the devel-
opment of P{T1,∆x}, j ≥ 2, is the same down to equation (C.15). Therefore we will start
with these equations.













































− f ′(∆x) , (C.27)
⇒
f ′(∆x) = N , (C.28)
⇒
f(∆x) = N∆x + c . (C.29)
Since f(0) = 0, then c = 0, so
P{T1,∆x} = N∆x + o(∆x) (C.30)







































= 0 − f ′(∆x) , (C.34)
⇒
f ′(∆x) = 0 , (C.35)
⇒
f(∆x) = c . (C.36)
Since f(0) = 0, then c = 0, so
P{Tj,∆x} = o(∆x), j ≥ 2 . (C.37)
C.3 Circular Normal










Also recall that the elemental area in the annulus with an inner radius of ρ and a











































































Now, to see what the probability is as h → 0, we follow the same method we have
used previously in this appendix. That is, we let P{ρ, ρ + h} = f(h) + o(h) and compute
something very similar to (C.5) (the only difference being we have replaced ∆x in (C.5)).







































As we have seen so far, we must force the use of L’Hopitals’ rule for (C.44) to be true.


























































































































































































T − f ′(0) . (C.48)
Therefore,
















T h + c . (C.50)
Again, since f(0) = 0, then c = 0. Recognizing that we were using h in place of dρ (to try








T dρ + o(dρ) . (C.51)
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0 = 0 − f ′(0) (C.56)
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Therefore,
f ′(0) = 0, (C.57)
⇒
f(h) = c . (C.58)
Again, since f(0) = 0, then c = 0. Recognizing that we were using h in place of dρ, we
have
P{Tj,dρ} = o(dρ), j ≥ 2 . (C.59)
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Appendix D. Truncated Binomial Conversion






















AiBN−i = (A + B)N . (D.2)
Our expression would be the normal binomial theorem except the lower limit on the





























































































Ac [A + B]N−c . (D.9)
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(AC)c [AD + B]N−c . (D.13)
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Appendix E. Scenario 3 Markov Example
What follows is an example of the derivation of the equations using the Markov chain
method. Along with the Markov model, we will be using variation of parameters to solve
the subsequent differential equations.
For Scenario 3, we have
Ṗ (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w)+






P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w) ,
(E.1)
P (Xt,f,x : t + f = w) =
(N − (t − 1))PTR
(1 − PTRx)
P (Xt−1,f,x : t + f < w)+
λAFT P (Xt,f−1,x : t + f < w) .
(E.2)
We will walk thru the sequence and observe the pattern. For brevity sake, we define
P (Xt,f,x) ≡ P (Xt,f,x : t + f < w).
State (t = 0, f = 0) (with initial condition P (X0,0,0) = 1):






P (X0,0,x) , (E.3)








λAFT + C1 , (E.4)
lnP (X0,0,x) = N ln(1 − PTRx) − λAFT x + C1 , (E.5)
P (X0,0,x) = (1 − PTRx)
Ne−λAFT xC , (E.6)
P (X0,0,x) = (1 − PTRx)
Ne−λAFT x . (E.7)
State (t = 0, f = 1) (with initial condition P (X0,1,0) = 0):






P (X0,1,x) , (E.8)
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which has the same homogenous solution as P (X0,0,x). Therefore when we use the variation
of parameters method, we assume the particular solution takes the form
P (X0,1,x)p = v (1 − PTRx)
N e−λAFT xC1 , (E.9)
where v is some function of x. Then, using variation of parameters, we have
v′ (1 − PTRx)
N e−λAFT x = λAFT P (X0,0,x) = λAFT (1 − PTRx)
N e−λAFT x , (E.10)
v′ = λAFT , (E.11)
v = λAFT x (E.12)
Therefore,
P (X0,1,x) = (1 − PTRx)
Ne−λAFT xλAFT x . (E.13)
Following similar evaluations we can calculate the other solutions. For each state we
will give the differential equation and the subsequent solution.
State (t = 0, f = 2) (with initial condition P (X0,2,0) = 0):






P (X0,2,x) , (E.14)






State (t = 0, f = 3) (with initial condition P (X0,3,0) = 0):






P (X0,3,x) , (E.16)






Now we see the pattern for the increasing f ’s. For t = 0, we have







Now we will look at t = 1.










P (X1,0,x) , (E.19)
P (X1,0,x)h = (1 − PTRx)
N−1 e−λAFT xC2 . (E.20)
Using variation of parameters,
P (X1,0,x)p = v (1 − PTRx)
N−1 e−λAFT x , (E.21)
v′ (1 − PTRx)




N e−λAFT x , (E.22)
v = NPTRx . (E.23)
Therefore,
P (X1,0,x) = NPTRx (1 − PTRx)
N−1 e−λAFT x . (E.24)
Using the same method we used for t = 0, we determine that






Similarly, we can determine that


























Appendix F. Attempt to solve time varying differential equation
The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for our work is of the form
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) −
(
PTt(ρ) + PFf (ρ)
)
P (Xt,f,ρ : t + f < w) , (F.1)
Ṗ (Xt,f,ρ : t + f = w) = PTt−1(ρ)P (Xt−1,f,ρ : t + f < w) +
PFf−1(ρ)P (Xt,f−1,ρ : t + f < w) . (F.2)
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0 0 . . . [Dt−1] 0





































−(PTi + PF0) 0 0 . . . 0 0
PF1−1 −(PTi + PF1) 0 . . . 0 0
0 PF2−1 −(PTi + PF2) . . . 0 0
0 0 PF3−1
. . . 0 0
0 0 0
. . . −(PTi + PFf−1) 0























dir,r−1 = PFr−2 . (F.8)
where r goes from 1 to f + 1, every other element is zero.
Note that in the preceding and subsequent discussion, i indicates the number of
TA’s (i.e., for the state X1,2, i = 1). In addition, we use the upper case letters (e.g. D)
to represent a matrix. We use the corresponding lower case letter (e.g. d) to represent
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the element of the matrix denoted by that letter’s upper case. A pair of subscripts on the
lower case letter indicate a specific element of the matrix (e.g. d3,2 would indicate the 3rd
row and 2nd column). Since we are dealing with block matrices, we designate the matrix
which is a part of the diagonal with a subscript. For example, the matrices which are on
the diagonal of the block matrix D are Di where, again i indicates that that block matrix
corresponds to the states that have i TA’s. The sub-diagonal block matrices are designated
by H i−1i−2 with a subscript and superscript. These are just notational conveniences. The
subscript indicates which states are being multiplied (in this case, the states with i − 2
TA’s). The superscript indicates the states to whose derivatives this matrix is contributing
(in this case, the states with i − 1 TA’s). If the subscript is less than zero, that matrix
does not exist.
DeRusso [13] says


















This requirement is equivalent to the requirement that
A(t1)A(t2) = A(t2)A(t1) . (F.13)
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Let T = AB and T̃ = BA. Further, let tx,y be the element in the xth row and yth column
of T. Apply similar definitions for t̃ and T̃ ; a and A; b and B. Further, let A and B both
be n × n and each is lower triangular with only one sub-diagonal, then
ti,i = ai,ibi,i , (F.14)
ti+1,i = ai+1,ibi,i + ai+1,i+1bi+1,i , (F.15)
ti+2,i = ai+2,i+1bi+1,i . (F.16)
In the same way, we also have
t̃i,i = bi,iai,i , (F.17)
t̃i+1,i = bi+1,iai,i + bi+1,i+1ai+1,i , (F.18)
t̃i+2,i = bi+2,i+1ai+1,i . (F.19)
It can be shown that T = T̃ if the following are conditions are met:
1) ai,ibi,i = bi,iai,i (a necessary condition)
2) The elements of diagonal of A are equal, and the elements of diagonal of B are
equal (a sufficient condition). The necessary part is: ai+1,ibi,i + ai+1,i+1bi+1,i = bi+1,iai,i +
bi+1,i+1ai+1,i.
3) ai+2,i+1bi+1,i = bi+2,i+1ai+1,i
Now in our case (initially), the A and B matrices are the A matrix of the differential
equation evaluated at two different times and the elements of the these matrices (a and b)
are matrices in and of themselves. Let s1 and s2 denote two different times, then we have
ai,i = Di−1(s1) , (F.20)
bi,i = Di−1(s2) , (F.21)
ai,i−1 = H
i−1
i−2 (s1) , (F.22)
bi,i−1 = H
i−1
i−2 (s2) . (F.23)
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and all other elements are zero.
We must first apply the three requirements to the block matrix found in (F.4), then
we apply the three conditions to the resulting matrices.
For example, for the first condition to be met; ai,ibi,i = bi,iai,i we see from (F.20)
thru (F.23) that
Di−1(s1)Di−1(s2) = Di−1(s2)Di−1(s1) (F.24)
must be true. To see if this is true, we must apply the three condition to (F.24).
Ultimately, the conditions that must be met boil down to
PFr−1(s1)PFr(s2) = PFr−1(s2)PFr(s1) , (F.25)
PTi(s1)PTi−1(s2) = PTi(s2)PTi−1(s1) (F.26)
These conditions are met for all six scenarios.
Now when t + f = w, we have
dir,r = −(PTi + PFr−1) , (F.27)
dir,r−1 = PFr−2 (F.28)
as r goes from 1 to f + 1 except when i = t, then
dtf+1,f+1 = 0 . (F.29)
The final result is that when t+f = w we have two additional conditions which must
be met.
PFf−1(s1)PTt(s2) = PFf−1(s2)PTt(s1) , (F.30)
PTt−1(s1)PFf (s2) = PTt−1(s2)PFf (s1) . (F.31)
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Five of the six scenarios do not meet these conditions. Scenario 2 does.
Therefore, the only scenario for which this method can help us find the probability
of a state where t + f < w is Scenario 2. But that is of little help, since the probabilities
for this scenario are readily found without this method.
F-6
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